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There exists a growing disenchantment with the current
allocation of subsidies in American higher education. The
rising costs and subsequent constrained financial problems
of higher education coupled with rising interest in the rights
of various minority groups have effectively raised questions
regarding the efficiency of the allocation of subsidies,
equality of opportunity, and equitable treatment of students.
As Schultz forcefully contends:
The allocation of resources to provide the instructional 
services of higher education in the United States is 
neither socially efficient nor equitable. The rise in 
personal incomes in this country, associated with econ­
omic growth, is making the traditional financing, pric­
ing, and supplying of these instructional services ever 
more obsolete. There is evidence, for example, that 
an inordinate part of the subsidies to higher education 
is used to provide higher educational services below 
cost to the growing proportion of students who come 
from families who have the income and wealth to pay the 
full cost.^
He elaborates on this statement later by stating:
Theodore W. Schultz, "Optimal Investment in College 
Instruction: Equity and Efficiency," in Investment in Educa­
tion: The Equitv-Efficiencv Quandrv. ed. by Theodore W. Schultz,
Supplement to the Journal of Political Economy, 80 (May/June, 
1972), p. 2.
Higher education is not organized to bring about an 
optimal investment in its instructional services. The 
source of the difficulty is in the financing, pricing, 
and supplying of these services. The financing tends 
to subsidize the wrong educational activities. The 
pricing bears no meaningful relation to the differences 
in the costs of producing the services, and the suppliers 
of these services are, therefore, substantially sheltered 
from the discipline of competition, notwithstanding the 
large number of colleges and universities in the United 
States. Current endeavors to cope with the financial 
adversities arising out of the pause in the educational 
boom of the sixties are efforts to "save" the existing 
organization. They are not seeking solutions for the 
basic underlying difficulty that has become increasingly 
acute, . . .f
For every different consideration inherent in subsidiz­
ing students and subsequently in assessing student fees— there 
has probably been a proposed solution. Some of these proposals 
have created problems, however, since the proposals are usually 
directed toward the solution of only one consideration and do 
not address themselves to the other considerations.
For example, it is generally accepted that equality of 
opportunity is a worthwhile goal. It is also generally accepted 
that, in the name of efficiency, the beneficiary of higher edu­
cation should pay a fair proportion of the cost of education.
The achievement of equality of opportunity usually implies 
that low-income students receive a higher subsidy from society 
than higher-income students. The achievement of efficiency, 
however, usually implies that those students whose degree will 
best benefit society receive the largest subsidy.
In either of these singularly purposed solutions, what 
happens to the student with low-income parents that enrolls in
^Ibid., p. 22.
3
a degree program for which there is no manpower demand? One 
solution would grant the student a large subsidy because he is 
from a low-income family while the other solution would grant 
him a low subsidy because he would not benefit society. It 
would seem as though both of the goals of equality of oppor­
tunity and efficiency have merit and that the proper solution 
lies in an optimum combination of the consideration of the two 
goals. In fact, it appears entirely possible that both goals 
could be sought simultaneously. That is, every student could 
receive a subsidy sufficient to allow him the opportunity to 
attend college while subsequently receiving a larger subsidy 
if he possesses the inherent characteristics to benefit society.
In fact, if equity is synonymous with fairness, is it
fair for two students to receive the same subsidy in higher
education if their family incomes are different and if they
enroll in different degree programs with different manpower
demands? Is it fair for a government with constrained resources
to oversubsidize one individual student while there exist other
potential students whose inherent capabilities could be enhanced
by higher education, but whose attendance is dependent upon
receiving a larger subsidy which would enable them to attend
college? Hansen and Weisbrod summarized this point very well :
The basic problem, then, is how to use limited public 
revenue resources most fairly and most effectively. A 
low or zero tuition level for everyone implies a sub­
stantially increased level of state support. But if only 
a limited amount of tax revenue is available for higher
education, which is more efficient? To use these funds 
to subsidize above average income students who can 
afford to go on to college and would do so, we predict, 
even without the subsidy? Or to subsidize lower income 
students, many of whom would otherwise not go to college 
at all, or who if they did go might have no alternative 
but to incur substantial debt?l
Singularly purposed solutions pose yet another problem 
in their lack of flexibility for adaptation to the specific 
needs of each unique educational system. It seems entirely 
possible for one state with large numbers of low income 
citizens and a low literacy level, for example, to place top 
priority on raising the educational level of its citizens by 
subsidizing low-income students; while another highly indus­
trialized state may place top priority on subsidizing certain 
technical or professional degree programs in order to build 
their manpower supply. Yet, it seems even more likely that 
most states would have varing combinations of the two extremes 
and would, therefore, need a system for optimally combining 
all their goals.
Many of these goals conflict, however, thereby setting 
the stage for a system which will provide the framework for 
rational compromise or the establishment of priorities. The 
assignment of priorities necessitates the involvement of a 
decision-making entity and necessitates the development of a
W .  Lee Hansen and Burton A. Weisbrod, "Students and 
Parents; A New Approach to Higher Education Finance," in 
Financing Higher Education: Alternatives for the Federal
Government. ed. by M. D. Orwig (Iowa City, Iowa; The Ameri­
can College Testing Program, 1971), pp. 121-22.
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system whereby the decision-maker can choose among the goals 
or choose combinations of the goals in an attempt to provide 
an optimum compromise for his particular situation.
Statement of the Problem 
It appears that if the appropriate decision-makers 
responsible for the financing of higher education are concerned 
about the goals of equity, equality of opportunity and effi­
ciency, and if the proper funding is truly constrained to pre­
clude the possibility of tuition-free higher education, 
is incumbent upon them to direct their subsidies more toward 
the achievement of all three goals rather than only one. The 
adjustment of subsidies would then, subsequently, affect the 
charges to be made to the students in the form of student fees.
Before the adjustment of subsidies can occur, though, 
a new system must be devised which will allow the evaluation 
of each student in terms of the three goals and which will 
allow the subsequent assessment of subsidies and student fees. 
Schultz states :
The problem to be solved is in the choice of educational 
activities that are to be subsidized by such funds . . . 
But, to be allocatively efficient, such subsidization 
must go directly to the students and not into the funds 
of colleges and universities, leaving it to them to 
distribute the financial aid to students by all manner 
of standards. Until those educational activities that 
require subsidization are identified and the amounts 
required determined, to simply proceed in allocating even 
more funds to subsidize all students is not only socially 
inefficient but grossly inequitable^
^Schultz, "Optimal Investment," pp. 24-5.
6
Since the proposed system of this study will have the 
net effect, at least from the student's perspective, of affect­
ing the fees which they will pay, and since it will be a system 
which will incorporate and direct the decisions of the appro­
priate decision-makers toward the considerations they deem 
important in the assessment of student fees, the proposed sys­
tem can very easily be labeled "a decision model for the assess­
ment of student fees in higher education." In the interest of 
brevity, it shall hereafter be referred to as the "student fee 
model" or "the model."
In summary, the problem to which this study is address­
ing itself can be stated as: Can a decision model be devised
which will allocate higher education subsidies and assess stu­
dent fees toward the achievement of an optimum combination of 
the student-related goals of equity, equality of opportunity, 
and efficiency?
Definition of Terms in the Study 
Societal Goals: Those goals of American higher education which
are sought by a state or government entity for the good of its 
constituency as a whole. These goals are generally different 
from goals of individuals. Usually societal goals are related 
to economic, social, or cultural progress of the state and to 
student-related goals such as equality of opportunity and equity.
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Full-Time-Equivalent (FTE) Student; A FTE student in an aca­
demic year is a statistic determined by:
-for undergraduate students— dividing the total number 
of undergraduate student credit hours by 30,
-for graduate students— dividing the total number of 
graduate student credit hours by 24.
Degree Program: Those approved courses and other approved
educational activities which normally culminate in the award­
ing of a particular degree.
Program Cost: The funds needed to provide the instruction
and the instruction-related services for a particular degree 
program for a given number of FTE students in a given academic 
year. In terms of the standard budget categories, these costs 
would normally come from all the educational budget categories 
except Organized Research and Extension and Public Service.
Student Fees: That portion of the program cost which is borne
by the student.
Subsidy: The explicit or implicit allocation of funds by a
higher education system. Normally, a student subsidy would 
be that portion of the program cost which is not borne by the 
student. However, it would be possible to subsidize a student 
for all of his program cost plus a portion of his living expenses
8
Student-Related Goals; Those goals of American higher educa­
tion which, depending upon their operational definition and 
the degree to which they are sought, will affect the subsidies 
and fees of students. In this study, they are proposed to be: 
equality of opportunity, equity, and efficiency.
These three goals are not operationally defined here 
since the nature of the student fee model proposes that each 
decision-maker uniquely define the goals according to the 
needs in his particular realm of responsibility. Chapter 3, 
however, offers an example of operational definitions for all 
three goals.
Assumptions
The following are the underlying assumptions for the 
proposed student fee model :
1) Society has thé primary responsibility for providing 
the funds needed for the support of higher education.
2) Student fees are collected only when it is necessary 
to supplement constrained societal funds.
3) Society has the responsibility of providing funds to 
higher education in a manner which will best achieve 
societal goals for higher education.
4) The student should have the opportunity to provide 
student fee funds in order to obtain the type of 
higher education which is consistent with his personal 
goals.
Objective of the Study 
The objective of this study is to develop a student 
fee model with two basic components, as follows:
1) A weighting system which will allow a decision­
maker to rationally and systematically incorpor­
ate any number or any combination of the student- 
related goals of higher education and to incorpor­
ate them at any desired level of relative 
importance.
2) An allocation system which will utilize the results 
of the weighting system in the determination of 
subsidies and the subsequent assessment of student 
fees for each student.
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study affects three primary 
areas in American higher education. One of these areas con­
cerns the apparent conflict and diversity that exists in stu­
dent-related goals. As mentioned previously, the inherent con­
flict between goals such as efficiency, equality of opportunity, 
and equity suggests the need for an optimal compromise. The 
judgement of optimality from one decision-maker to another can 
vary so it seems significant to provide a decision model which 
will allow the responsible decision-makers to operationally 
define their unique optimal compromises.
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Another area concerns the allocation of funds to 
achieve goals. The student-related goals of equity, equal 
opportunity and efficiency have not been concurrently pin­
pointed as targets for the allocation of funds in a comprehen­
sive or coordinated fashion. It appears particularly signifi­
cant to enable the long-standing American ideals of equality 
of opportunity and equity to be forthrightly stated as goals 
of American higher education and to allocate funds toward 
their achievement.
The final area concerns the manner in which higher 
education systems have traditionally been structured and 
financed. Institutions were funded in the name of autonomy 
and diversity regardless of the needs of the students or the 
needs of society. Somehow, it was hoped, the students would 
enroll and society would be served. It, therefore, seems 
significant to propose a "prescriptive" structure for the 
financing of higher education within which the needs of 
society and the needs of students can be met while simulta­
neously "prescribing" a structure which will promote diversity, 
autonomy and other system goals.
If a new methodology is developed which will enable 
American higher education to become more accountable to the 
student-related goals, then research will be stimulated in new 
areas. Student and program characteristics will have to be 
researched relative to their impact on both the student-related 
and system-wide goals. Degree programs will have to be related 
to manpower supply and demand. Research will also need to be
11
accelerated in all questions regarding equality of opportunity.
In summary, each unique system of higher education, 
which has the responsibility to be accountable to the student- 
related goals, will need research to aid the decision-makers 
in defining the precise combination of criteria which will 
provide an optimum merger of the desired goals.
CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The theoretical framework for this study is based 
upon the assumption that administration is the process of 
decision-making. Since the purpose of this study is to pro­
vide a decision-making structure which will more nearly allow 
the achievement of selected higher education goals through 
the allocation of student subsidies and the assessment of 
student fees, the review of related literature must necessar­
ily include a review of current and proposed student aid pro­
grams, a review of student-related goals of American higher 
education, as well as consideration of administration as 
decision-making.
Administration as Decision-Making 
Many authors through the years have described the 
decision-making process in administration. Fayol described 
the process as: planning, organization, command, coordination
and control.  ̂ In 1937, Gulick extended Fayol's process to the
^Henri Fayol, "The Administrative Theory in the State," 
in Papers on the Science of Administration, ed. by Luther Gulick 
and Lynda11 F. Urwick (New York; Institute of Public Adminis­
tration, 1937), p. 101.
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familiar POSDCORB.^ Barnard, however, was one of the first 
to define the primary role of an administrator as a decision­
maker when he stated: "In short, a characteristic of the
services of executives is that they represent a specializa­
tion of the process of making organization decisions— and
2this is the essence of their functions."
Simon, considered by many to be the originator of the
theory of administration as dec is ion-making, extended the role
of the executive as a decision-maker into structuring the
organization as a decision-making organization.
The executive's job involves not only making 
decisions himself, but also seeing that the 
organization, or part of an organization, that 
he directs makes decisions effectively. The 
vast bulk of the decision-making activity for 
which he is responsible is not his personal 
activity, but the activity of his subordinates.
Griffiths also succinctly espouses this viewpoint with his 
statement: "The position taken is that the central function
of administration is directing and controlling the decision­
making process.
^Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," 
in ibid., p. 13.
^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 189.
^Herbert A. Simon, The New Science of Management 
Decision, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), pp. 4-5.
^Daniel E. Griffiths, "Administration as Decision­
making," in Administrative Theory in Education, ed. by 
Andrew W. Halpin (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958), pp 121-22
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One of Simon's most potent contribution to the theory of 
administration as decision-making may have been his elabora­
tion upon decision-making as optimal choices between alterna­
tive courses of action. This elaboration led him and the 
field of administration into mathematical theories, cyber­
netics, operations research, and other techniques which pro­
duce alternatives.
Simon also introduced the notion of classifying types 
of decisions as "programmed" or "non-programmed."  ̂ According 
to Simon, "programmed" decisions are those repetitive deci­
sions for which routine procedures are developed. The "non­
programmed" decisions are those which are "novel, unstruc-
2tured, and consequential."
Selznick, similarly, distinguishes between "routine 
decisions" and "critical decisions. Palola, Lehmann, and 
Blischke, in applying Selznick's definition of "critical 
decisions" to statewide educational networks stated; "Such 
decisions determine the direction of its evolution and design 
the means for its goal achievement, and thereby set the general 
character and identity which will guide its long-range develop­
ment. They further define the three most critical types of
^Simon, The New Science, p. 6.
^Ibid.
^P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957), p. 35.
^Ernest G. Palola, Timothy Lehmann, and William R. 
Blischke, Higher Education by Design: The Sociology of Plan­
ning (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1970),
p. 13.
15
critical decisions in higher education; "the setting of goals 
and the development of programs to meet the goals; the educa­
tional integration of the system; and the allocation of 
resources in the network.
The proper allocation of resources has long been con­
sidered an effective administrative procedure for aiding the 
achievement of organizational goals. Gulick included the pro­
cess of budgeting in his POSDCORB and Barnard discussed the 
"method of incentives." More recently, planning,programming, 
budgeting systems (PPBS) have been developed as a means of 
budgeting resources for the accomplishment of program goals.^ 
Program goals are not the on]y goals of American 
higher education. There also exist student-related goals of 
equality of opportunity, equity and efficiency which can also 
be more readily accomplished through the proper allocation of 
resources.
Student-Related Goals of American 
Higher Education 
The literature is replete with the discussion of goals 
for American higher education. One of the inherent problems 
in defining goals for higher education is in its role as a
^Ibid., p. 14.
^Barnard, Functions of the Executive, p. 142.
^See, for example. Hartley, Harry J., or Parden, Robert 
J., referenced in the Selected Bibliography.
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servant to the public. In other words, the goals and needs 
of society may conflict with the goals and needs of those 
individuals it serves. Lawrence states:
The needs and aspirations of the state are not in 
every respect compatible with either the needs and 
aspirations of the individual or the sum of the needs 
and the aspirations of all of the individuals of the 
state. For the state, education is perceived to be an 
important component of social preservation and progress.
For the individual, education is perceived to be the 
major avenue to social and financial advancement, and 
evidence supports this perception. While education is 
only one major component in meeting the needs and aspira­
tions of the state, for most individuals education is the 
only viable hope for future advancement. Since both the 
individual and the state have a common (although unidenti­
cal) interest in education, the balance between the 
interests of the individual and the interests of the 
state must be carefully weighted in the process of state 
planning.^
If the individual perceives higher education as either 
the major or only avenue to future advancement, then he has 
to be concerned about his opportunity for access to higher edu­
cation. Lawrence continues:
Since education and educational achievement are per­
ceived to be avenues to social and financial advancement, 
the question of who shall be given the opportunity to 
benefit from educational services has long been answered 
on paper: everyone who is qualified and desires to pur­
sue a course in postsecondary education should have the 
opportunity. In fact, however, the opportunity is not 
open to everyone.2
Ben Lawrence, "Issues Related to the Purposes of 
Postsecondary Education," in Statewide Planning for Post- 
secondary Education: Issues and Design, ed. by Lyman A.
Glenny and George B. Weathersby (Boulder, Colorado: Western
Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1971), p. 2.
^Ibid., p. 4.
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Bolton elaborates on the difference between "equality
of opportunity" and "equality of achievement";
"Equality of opportunity" sums up what I have in mind.
This principle is that all should have an equal oppor­
tunity to exploit his native talents and to better the 
position of his father. It is opportunity which is to 
be equal, not achievement.^
The societal goals for American higher education are
numerous and diverse— particularly in light of its role as a
servant of the public. It must be diverse enough to satisfy
each individual's need— yet it must be efficient. It must be
equitable to each student— yet it must be efficient. These
apparent paradoxes are summarized very well as:
Most would agree that the American higher education 
system should be efficient, equitable, diverse, and 
of high quality. However, in the actual structuring 
of higher education system, these goals often conflict. 
For example, the quest for equity may mean that the 
poorer students and those least well prepared must 
be given high priority in college and university 
attendance. While such a decision would insure 
progress toward the goal of social justice, it would, 
in all likelihood, be bought at some sacrifice in 
educational quality, the growth of the economy, and 
efficiency in higher education. Sensitive public 
policy must seek to provide a higher education system 
which incorporates the optimum compromise between 
these diverse and sometimes conflicting goals.^
Lawrence reinforces the challenge of finding an opti­
mum compromise. He claims that hostility is produced if the
Roger E. Bolton, "The Economics and Public Financing 
of Higher Education: An Overview," in The Economics and Finan­
cing of Higher Education in the United States: A Compendium
of Papers, (Hereinafter referred to as Economic Report), Joint 
Committee Print, (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,
1969), p. 56.
pU. S., Congress, "Introduction" in ibid., p. 2.
18
individual becomes interested and then cannot fulfill his
newly found interest. He challenges state planners with:
Instead of side stepping the issue, the response of 
responsible planners should be to devise means by 
which the interests and aspirations of the individual 
and the interests and aspirations of the state can 
reinforce each other. This is indeed a challenge as 
well as a grave responsibility for the state planning 
function.
Thus, it appears that, in the distribution of subsi­
dies and the assessment of student fees, American higher edu­
cation needs to strive toward the achievement of the two goals 
of equality of opportunity and efficiency while simultaneously 
treating all students equitably. Since the different defini­
tions of these goals or the degree to which each is sought 
will affect the subsidies and student fees, the three goals 
of equity, efficiency, and equality of opportunity are student- 
related. A discussion of each of these goals and pertinent 
comments from the literature will follow.
Equity and Efficiency 
Equity is concerned with the "fairness" of the distri­
bution of subsidies. Efficiency is concerned with the "return" 
per dollar invested. These two ideals are likely to directly 
conflict with each other. To achieve equity almost guarantees 
inefficiency; and vice versa. As Hansen and Weisbrod said:
The social objectives of efficiency and equity are in 
fact quite likely to conflict, thereby complicating 
the issue. Consideration of efficiency might suggest 
that higher education should be provided to some young
^Lawrence, "Issues Related to Purposes," p. 3.
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people but not to all; implicit is the widely held 
assumption that not everyone can benefit significantly 
from higher education. But there is still the equity 
question: is it "fair" for some youngsters to receive
public subsidies while others do not? An efficient 
allocation of resources can be inequitable.
And an equitable allocation of resources can be ineffi­
cient. If, for example, every youngster were not only 
offered the opportunity to go to college for four years, 
but were required to go, then all college age people 
would receive a similar public subsidy. But if this 
is more equitable it is doubtless less efficient, for 
not everyone is likely to benefit enough to cover the 
costs of resources required to educate them. The con­
flict between equity and economic efficiency in higher 
education planning appears to be a genuine one; . . .1
Efficiency is not only concerned with sending the 
"right" students to college. The degree programs which are 
financed can also be classed as "returns"— particularly in 
terms of manpower supply. For American higher education to 
be efficient, it should perhaps subsidize more those degree 
programs for which the economy has a high demand and subsidize 
less those degree programs with less demand.
Another aspect of efficiency is for American higher 
education to subsidize more those students which will return 
more to the government in the form of higher taxes because of 
higher salaries. Counter to this rationale, however, are those 
who argue that the higher salaries are enough incentive for 
students to enroll in these programs and that the government 
should subsidize the lower salaried but important public serv­
ice professions such as teaching and social workers.
^W. Lee Hansen and Burton Weisbrod, "The Search for 
Equity in the Provision and Finance of Higher Education," in 
Economic Report, pp. 108-9.
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The student-related goal of efficiency not only calls
for an efficient allocation of subsidies to enable upwardly
aspiring students to attend college but it also should enable
the most able or high ability highschool graduates who aspire
to attend college to do so. This is justified from a societal
perspective on the rationale that the high ability students
will benefit more from a higher education and will, therefore,
return more benefits to society. Segal defines this type of
efficiency and the role of the policy makers as:
Efficiency here is used in the programming sense of 
maximizing the rate of return for a given investment.
The question we ask is what are the implications of a 
government education policy which has as its aim maxi­
mizing the social rate of return for a given budgetary 
outlay.1
Segal reviews the conflicting studies regarding the 
efficiency gains to be made by subsidizing only the high abil­
ity students. He also suggests that since the children of 
college graduates are more likely to go to college, long term 
efficiency gains might be significant if policy makers concen­
trated on broadening educational opportunity rather than con­
centrating all resources on short term efficiency gains in 
in the form of subsidizing of high ability students.^
Both Segal and Berls conclude that significant numbers 
of high ability high school graduates are not going into higher 
education. Segal states:
^David Segal,"'Equity' versus 'Efficiency' in Higher 
Education," in Economic Report, p. 141.
^Ibid., p. 143.
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Even so, we find that significant percentages of 
able high school graduates appear to be left out 
of the higher educational system for financial 
reasons.1
Berls, after reviewing the statistics relating ability and
socioeconomic status (SES) from the follow-up study of 2.6
million high school graduates of Project Talent, concludes:
The highest probability of college attendance is 
about eighty-two per cent for the high school 
graduates in the top ability quintile who also 
have the highest SES, whereas the graduates of 
equal ability, but low SES, have a probability of 
college entrance of only thirty-seven per cent, or 
less than half the likelihood of college entrance 
of the first group. This pattern remains true of 
each of the ability groups: the higher the SES
the greater amount of college attendance even 
though ability is equal.2
The advocates of the private versus public benefit 
arena agree on one principle: the beneficiaries of higher
education should pay their fair share of the costs. The dis­
agreements are generally over identifying and measuring the 
benefits which accrue to either the individual or to society. 
The economic benefits (such as increased earnings for the indi­
vidual or increased tax intake for society) are hard enough to 
identify and measure hut there also exist non-economic bene­
fits (such as a "better life" for the individual or "better 
citizens" for society) which are almost impossible to measure 
and to document as an effect of higher education.
^Ibid.
2Robert H. Berls, "Higher Education Opportunity and 
Achievement in the United States," in Economic Report, p. 147,
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One conclusion which can be drawn from the literature
is that both student and society should pay part of the costs.
As Orwig summarized:
Although the issue of the private and public benefits 
of higher education is represented at both extremes—  
with advocates of no public support and advocates of 
complete public support— most people agree that the 
benefits of higher education are shared by the indi­
vidual and society and, as a consequence, that the 
cost of higher education should be shared by students 
and society.!
Some of the benefits may accrue exclusively to the indi­
vidual, some to the public; but a large majority of the benefits 
mutually accrue to both sides. As stated in a study submitted 
to the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress:
The difficulty is assessing these returns inheres in 
the fact that many of the benefits as well as the 
costs of higher education do not accrue directly to 
the individual who is being educated. Indirectly, 
the student's family, as well as the entire society, 
benefits when a student obtains a higher education.
In other words, there is no single beneficiary. Cartter
stated another reason for sharing the costs:
I believe that society should bear a part of the 
cost both because there are obvious social benefits of 
living in a society with an educated citizenry, and 
because I would like to encourage individuals to con­
sume more education than they ordinarily would if 
they themselves had to pay for its full cost. . . .
On the other hand, I believe that adult educational 
experiences are largely undervalued (and frequently 
wasted) when one does not have to make some personal
M. D. Orwig, "Summarizing the Issues: The Federal
Government and the Finance of Higher Education," in Financing 
Higher Education; Alternatives for the Federal Government, 
ed. by M. D. Orwig (Iowa City, Iowa: The American College
Testing Program, 1971), p. 351.
^U. S. Congress, "Introduction," p. 5.
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sacrifice. Therefore, I believe that a student or 
his parents should contribute to educational costs, 
although such expected contributions should be 
adjusted to ability to pay.l
Tyler presents guidelines for Federal allocations to
higher education institutions. These guidelines, however, can
apply to any appropriating agency.
Other legislation, particularly appropriation bills, 
should be shaped so as to encourage effectiveness and 
efficiency in the operation of colleges and universi­
ties, and to reduce the wastes of obsolete policies 
and practices. This might include some of the follow­
ing:
1. Channeling support through student stipends 
to increase institutional responsiveness to the 
demands of students and their parents.
2. Concentrating support where greatest needs 
exist rather than dissipating resources through widely 
scattered efforts. . . .  It is important to avoid
a method of support which simply increases funds avail­
able without requiring an analysis of educational prob­
lems in the institution and a plan to focus efforts on 
promising solutions to the problems. When grants are 
made to educational institutions without categorical 
provisions, most of the increased funds are allocated 
on the faculty-administration bargaining table and not 
on the basis of critical educational problems.2
The low-tuition model prevalent throughout public higher 
education in the United States is designed to promote equality 
of opportunity while tacitly espousing equal subsidies to all 
students. That this is not true is easily shown by examining 
the various program budget publications which are becoming 
evident across the country.
^Allan M. Cartter, "Student Financial Aid," in Univer­
sal Higher Education: Costs and Benefits, (Washington, D. C.:
American Council on Education, 1971), p. 116.
^Ralph W. Tyler, "The Changing Structure of American 
Institutions of Higher Education," in Economic Report, p. 320.
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For example, in an annual operating budget needs 
publication of the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educa­
tion; the budget needs for three Oklahoma institutions of 
higher education for the 1973-74 fiscal year were computed 
on a program basis.^ The three institutions served as pilot 
institutions for a forthcoming statewide, computerized pro­
gram budgeting model. The publication shows wide variances 
in program cost and program subsidization per student in each 
institution as well as across institutions.
Table 1 shows comparative data on program cost and 
program subsidization of selected programs. As can be noted 
from the table, program cost varied across institutions from 
$3,770 per full-time-equivalent (FTE) student in physics at 
Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts to $520 per FTE in account­
ing at Tulsa Junior College. By institutions, the variances 
in program cost were; Central State University, $2,564 per FTE 
to $603 per FTE; Oklahoma College of Liberal Arts, $3,770 per 
FTE to $1,007 per FTE; Tulsa Junior College, $3,554 per FTE 
to $520 per FTE.
Unless student fees are raised by the fall semester 
of 1973, both Central State University and Oklahoma College 
of Liberal Arts will charge FTE resident students $276 in stu­
dent fees per academic year and Tulsa Junior College will charge
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, Operating 
Budget Needs of the Oklahoma State System of Higher Education 
for the 1973-74 Fiscal Year (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Education, 1973), pp. 30-2.
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$188. Therefore, for the three institutions, subsidies 
per FTE will range from $3,494 to $327 a year. By student
credit hour, these subsidies will range from $116.47 to
$10.90. Clearly, in this case, the subsidies are far from 
equal.
Equality of Opportunity
There are many ways to define and measure equality
of opportunity. Fromkin proposes three criteria for the
measurement of equality of opportunity: social origins,
ability, and aspirations. They are as follows:
Social Origins. One may postulate that equality 
of opportunity is achieved whenever a student, 
irrespective of the income of his family, is 
equally likely to attend a post-secondary
institution as any other student.
Ability. Another concept of equality of 
opportunity would require that all high school 
graduates of equal ability or achievement have 
an equal opportunity to enroll in a college 
and graduate from it.
Aspirations. A third definition of equality of 
opportunity would be satisfied if each high school 
senior who wished to attend an institution of 
higher education had a chance to do so.l
^J. Fromkin, Aspirations, Enrollments, and Resources 
The Challenge to Higher Education in the Seventies, United 
States Office of Education Document OE-50058 (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 89.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF SELECTED PROGRAM COSTS AND SUBSIDIES AT 





Liberal Arts Tulsa Junior College
FTE Cost per Subsidy FTE per FTE FTE
Cost per Subsidy 





Accounting 506 904 628 31 1789 1513 102 520 332
Art 118 1010 734 82 1018 742 67 1065 877
Biology 148 1353 1077 48 1819 1543 40 1503 1315
Business 1625 891 615 153 1167 891 351 706 518
Business (MBA) 115 1889 1613 -------- — — — —• — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Chemistry 66 1685 1409 34 2004 1728 12 1555 1367
Economics 38 909 633 22 1061 785 3 993 805
Elem. Educ. 830 901 625 142 1051 775 48 1575 1387
Elem. Educ. (M Ed) 98 1590 1314 — — — —-------- -------- — — — — ----- — —
English 162 1090 814 70 1168 892 18 1545 1357
Physical Educ. 264 1069 793 48 1007 731 20 820 632
History 74 1065 789 46 1110 834 22 908 720
Home Economics 72 1081 805 59 1565 1289 9 951 763
Mathematics 81 1379 1103 43 2062 1786 20 914 726
Physics 24 2564 2288 7 3770 3494 7 1334 1146
Political Science 32 923 647 30 1318 1042 20 639 451
Psychology 343 780 504 52 1029 753 70 1046 858
Sociology 184 603 327 66 1268 992 35 952 764
Spanish — — — — — — — — — 18 1657 1381 4 3554 3366
All Programs 4780 981 705 951 1305 1029 848 900 712
NJ
<y>
Source: Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, Operating Budget Needs of the Oklahoma
State System of Higher Education for the 1973-74 Fiscal Year (Oklahoma City: Okla­
homa State Regents for Higher Education, January, 1973), pp. 30-32.
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Equality of opportunity means to others that there
should not be any artificial constraints on an individual's
attempt to improve his situation. The only constraint on
upward mobility should be ability, motivation and/or other
such natural characteristics of the individual. To those who
fear this type of equality of opportunity would lead to a
classless society, Berls answers:
The less restraint the society places on vertical 
social mobility the more the sorting of individuals 
into occupations and social classes will be deter­
mined by individual innate ability, which is largely 
hereditary. But as long as society values intelli­
gence and the mental ability and performance that 
goes along with it, and as long as society places 
high value on occupations that draw heavily on men­
tal ability, then we can expect that classes in the 
society will be sorted by ability and that this 
tendency is likely to increase rather than disappear 
as we achieve equality of opportunity.1
In summary, if an individual has the ability and is 
willing to work, he should be given every opportunity to 
improve himself. The height of his upward mobility should be 
governed by these inherent abilities and desires and not by 
society. This criteria— inherent ability and desire to work—  
is the major criteria which separates higher education subsi­
dies from welfare programs. As Bolton states:
The strategy is, however, appealing because it has 
less of the "give-away" ring than other measures.
The aid the recipient gets has an enormous value, 
but it also requires a great input of his own— his 
time and effort. It helps him create something of 
value out of his innate potential which is already 
there. And it is redistribution which is only 
temporarily at the expense of others, for it does
^Berls, "Opportunity and Achievement," p. 202
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more than support current consumption. This is 
because it raises the incomes and appreciation of 
education in people who are now poor and thus tends 
automatically to create the financial ability and 
motivation for them to bequeath education to later 
generations.^
Many contend it is enough to provide equal opportunity,
and, in fact, contend that not everybody should go to college.
Bolton agrees by saying;
Not everyone can profitably use the same education as 
others, either for his own benefit or for society's.
For another thing, not even everybody who can afford 
to do so wants to make the heavy investment in educa­
tion. This would be true for some even if all the 
benefits were capturable by the individual. Some 
people have a much greater preference for consumption 
now rather than in the future, which outweighs the 
future return an education brings. Others have 
unusually high opportunity costs at a young age, 
because they can already command high earnings (some 
athletes and entertainers are examples).^
Others contend that the way to assure equality of 
opportunity is to provide universal higher education. They 
further contend that if higher education is good for society 
in general then perhaps we should have mandatory higher edu­
cation— at least for the first two years. They argue: the
psychic costs of leaving home, the loss of earning power to 
the student, the amount of time and energy involved in a 
college degree all combine to form a formidable barrier to 
the undecided potential student.^ Schultz adds that one of
^Bolton, "Economics and Financing: Overview," p. 67.
^Ibid.. p. 56.
^See Bolton, ibid. for an excellent survey of both 
monetary and non-monetary barriers to potential students.
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the primary functions of higher education is to discover tal­
ent and, if necessary, society should pay students to "try 
out" college. He suggests society would gain more in uncover­
ing the hidden talent of the students who would not otherwise 
go to college than it would lose in wasting funds on the stu­
dents with no talent.1
Cartter, however, disagrees with mandatory or compul­
sory higher education:
Even so, the cost of compulsory universal higher edu­
cation is so high, and so evidently wasteful in both 
human and economic terms, that I shall dismiss it in 
the remainder of this paper. It would run counter to 
all the present trends of conferring adulthood at age 
eighteen and of encouraging the assumption by young 
men and women of decision-making powers over their 
own lives.2
Compromise versions of universal higher education 
include: expanded access for the first two years of college
through free tuition, expanded access through full financial 
aid to low-income students, and expanded access through close 
proximity to low-cost two-year colleges. All of these propos­
als increase the educational opportunity for potential stu­
dents and all have been attempted to some degree. The first 
compromise— two years of free tuition— is less efficient than 
the others since it provides subsidies to students regardless 
of whether they need it. The second compromise— full financial
^Theodore W. Schultz, "Resources for Higher Education: 
An Economist's View," in Journal of Political Economy, (May/ 
June, 1968), pp. 327-47.
^Allan M. Cartter," Student Financial Aid," in Univer­
sal Higher Education: Costs and Benefits (Washington, D. C.:
American Council on Education, 1971), pp. 112-13.
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aid— is widely attempted but rarely achieved because of finan­
cial and political problems. The third compromise— close 
proximity to two-year colleges— has been largely accomplished 
in California and Florida and is a goal of several other 
states. Some, however, have suggested that reliance on two- 
year institutions encourages a "track-system" whereby low- 
income students are confined to two-year colleges and higher- 
income students typically enroll in universities.^
The problems of providing universal higher education 
are primarily financial. Various proposals for achieving 
universal higher education have been offered in the literature, 
As Hausman summarized:
Except for mandating universal higher education—  
probably both unaffordable and politically unrealistic 
— virtually no avenue has been unexplored. Suggestions 
include variations of the GI Bill of Rights and propos­
als for vouchers for $2,500 a year for students to con­
tinue their education for at least two years. They 
range from carefully structured, actuarially based pro­
posals to permit an individual to pay for a college 
education over a life-time of earnings to unrestricted 
institutional grants. A number of states— California 
and Florida, in particular— have sought equal educa­
tional opportunity through widespread establishment of 
two-year colleges.2
Has equality of opportunity been achieved? According
to probabilities compiled from Project Talent, there still
appears to be room for improvement. In tables prepared by
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Capitol 
and the Campus: State Responsibilitv for Postsecondarv Educa­
tion (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), p. 82.
2Louis Hausman, "Pressures, Benefits, and Options," 
Universal Higher Education: Costs and Benefits. (Washington,
D. C.: American Council on Education, 1971), p. 14.
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Robert Berls,^ the probability of high school graduates enter­
ing college, full or part-time, during the year following their 
graduation is distinctly related to socioeconomic status (SES): 
the probability for high SES graduates is 77.9 per cent while 
low SES graduates have only a 13.9 per cent probability. When 
the high school graduates are followed for five years there 
is still a distinct difference since the probability of high 
SES high school graduates entering college within five years 
of graduation is 79.4 per cent while the low SES high school 
graduates show only a 22.8 per cent probability.
The preceding statistics do not prove that the avail­
ability of sufficient funds to the low SES graduates would 
have affected the probability of their attending college. As 
Berls stated: "The reasons why high school graduates do not
enter college are complex, varied, and sometimes conflicting.
Socioeconomic status, lack of interest, poor record in high
2school, and other reasons all have a function, . . . "  How­
ever, after reviewing a longitudinal study of 10,000 high 
school graduates which asked for reasons for not attending 
college, he concluded: "The two most cited reasons (both sexes
combined) were 'not enough money' and 'prefer to work.' Lack 
of interest, poor ability or low grades, or a preference for 
marriage in the case of women, were close behind, but lack of 
money is the predominant reason.




Berls presents a good review of various studies which 
cite conflicting opinions on the causes of college attendance 
patterns. These conflicting opinions primarily included rea­
sons such as lack of interest, parental influence, peer influ­
ence, and educational attainment of parents.1 While these 
reasons may lessen the impact of the differences in probability 
of college attendance between low and high SES high school 
graduates cited previously, they do not convincingly dispel 
the suspicion that equality of opportunity has not been 
achieved.
These conflicting reasons, however, are primarily 
reasons for not wanting to attend college and, according to 
Bolton, students should have an equal opportunity to go to 
college— if they desire. Perhaps higher education planners 
whose espoused goals include equality of opportunity can con­
centrate on removing financial constraints from those students 
that desire to go to college and not dilute their energies on 
students who do not desire to go.
Equality of opportunity does not mean that the planners 
have to provide the "same opportunity" to all high school grad­
uates. Rather, it means that any high school graduate that 
desires to improve himself with higher education should not be 
restrained by a lack of financial resources. The "same oppor­
tunity" models (e.g. free tuition or low-tuition models) are
llbid., pp. 151-7.
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inefficient since, in a system with constrained resources, they 
rob the system of funds needed to remove the financial con­
straints on those high school graduates who desire to go to 
college but cannot because of a lack of funds.
Current Programs of Student Aid 
In order to provide equity and equal opportunity to 
any student that desires to go to college, many different 
kinds of "financial aid" programs have been established or 
proposed across the nation.^ There are many variations of 
each but, basically they have the following major features:
Scholarships and Grants: Scholarships and grants may be tax
or privately supported. They are usually directed toward 
individual students on a financial need or ability basis.
The State and Federal governments are increasingly 
participating in the scholarship method of directing aid to 
the financially needy and minority groups. For example, the 
Higher Education Act of 1955 instigated "Opportunity Grants" 
which were restricted to low-income students, and the Higher 
Education Amendments of 1972 are an attempt to increase the 
amount of the grants to the students.
The Amendments of 1972 also propose grants to institu­
tions based partially upon the number of enrolled students with
For detailed surveys and critiques of proposals and 
programs check the Selected Bibliography for Chambers, M. M . , 
and papers in The Economic Committee Report, Financing Higher 
Education: Alternatives for the Federal Government and Univer­
sal Higher Education: Costs and Benefits.
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"Opportunity Grants." This obviously encourages the institu­
tions to recruit the low-income students. Some states are 
increasing the amount of State scholarship funds to help off­
set the rising student fees and as a means of maintaining or 
improving equal educational opportunity.
Scholarships and grants are an important type of aid 
to students, but funds are usually insufficient to have signif­
icant effect on equal opportunity for all students. Some stu­
dents needing aid are unaware of the possibilities of schol­
arships or grants and, therefore, do not entertain the possi­
bilities of entering college.
The primary criticism of the types of scholarships and 
grants which are available, however, is concerned with the 
lack of coordination between the administration of the scholar­
ships and grants and the financing of higher education. The 
costs of higher education can rise significantly or the number 
of students needing aid can rise significantly without any 
effect on the amount of funds available for scholarships and 
grants.
Wattenbarger comments on the practice of concurrently
increasing fees and scholarships;
A common answer to objections to increased student fees 
is to provide more scholarship funds. This seems to be 
a peculiar policy, as R. L. Johns of the University of 
Florida, in a report to the Select Council on Post-High 
School Education, points out:"It is an odd policy which would increase fees to avoid 
increasing appropriations for higher institutions and 
then provide appropriations for scholarships so that 
students can pay the fees. If this policy of increasing
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fees to finance higher education is based on the assump­
tion that only the students whose parents are able to 
pay the fees should have the opportunity for a college 
education, one wonders how such an assumption can be , 
reconciled with the principles of American democracy."
Work-Study; The Higher Education Act of 1965 provided reim­
bursement funds which encouraged prospective employers to 
hire students on a part-time basis. The funds are used to 
pay a part of the wage of the student, thus providing the 
employer with inexpensive labor and the student with a job.
The same criticism stated previously for scholarships 
and grants prevail in this approach also. That is, there are 
insufficient funds and a lack of coordination. The amount of 
funds available in work-study is even less than is available 
for scholarships and grants.
Another criticism suggests that the employer is getting 
the aid rather than the student. If the student would have 
gotten the job at the regular wage, then the Federal fu.ids did 
not aid the student at all.
Bolton describes another criticism of this financial 
aid program.
While recognizing the real value of this program, 
some have questioned it by asking who is really getting 
the subsidy. One suspects that some of the time spent 
working must be at the expense of time studying. If
James L. Wattenbarger, "Student Fees and Public Respon­
sibility," in Financing Higher Education: Alternatives for the
Federal Government, ed. by M. D. Orwig (Iowa City; The American 
College Testing Program, 1971), p. 152, quoting Roe L. Johns, 
"Some Notes on the Financing of Higher Education," mimeographed 
(Gainesville: University of Florida).
36
the working student sacrifices the quality of his 
education, what is happening of course is that the 
rest of the student body is getting some of the 
subsidy, because the college can reduce the costs 
it incurs and which must be financed by student 
fees. 1
Guaranteed Loans; Loans have always been one of the means 
available for students to finance their education. Recently, 
however, the Federal government and a large number of states 
have established guaranteed student loan programs. These 
loans for the most part, are made to students by private 
lending agencies and are guaranteed by the State and/or Fed­
eral government. For most students, the interest is paid by 
the Federal government until after the student graduates. The 
student then has a maximum of ten years to repay the loan plus 
the interest which is compiled during the repayment period.
Guarantees have their most potent effect on low income 
students who are financially unable to meet repayments 
on commercial loans, but are quite confident they can 
complete an education and use it profitably. For them, 
the guarantee eliminates the only real barrier, which 
is the risk their lenders feel.2
The primary criticism of guaranteed loans is well stated 
by Chambers: "This initial handicap in life is heavily discrim­
inative against young women, as well as discriminative against 
all students from low-income families, and is retrogressive 
in tendency."^
^Bolton, "Economics and Financing: Overview," p. 97.
^Ibid., p. 82.
^M. M. Chambers, Higher Education: Who Pays? Who
Gains? (Danville, Illinois; The Interstate Printers and 
Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 93.
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Bolton adds other criticisms:
A major criticism of the existing loan guarantee 
programs is that the maximum amounts which can be 
borrowed are too low, and the repayment periods too 
short, to be very effective. For undergraduates, 
a limit of $1,000-1,500 per year is common, and 
repayment must be completed by ten years after 
academic work is finished.
A second major criticism is that there is some 
tendency in loan guarantee systems to keep the 
maximum guaranteed interest rate rigid in the face 
of changing conditions in the money markets. . . . 
Keeping the guaranteed rate rigid even when other 
interest rates are rising makes it very difficult 
for students to compete with other borrowers, because 
lenders prefer the higher rates available on other 
assets nearly as safe. . . . And there is reason 
to believe that investment by poorer families is the 
most likely to fall by the wayside when banks and 
other lenders curtail their loans: the few loans
they do make are to established customers or other 
higher income people whose future business will be 
substantial, and with whom it is important to keep 
up banking contacts.^
Income Contingent Loans: One of the more recent proposals
for financing higher education involves a postponement of 
tuition and/or other educational expenses for the student 
until he graduates and starts earning money. His repayment 
scheme is essentially a percentage of his lifetime earnings. 
Some private institutions, such as Yale University, and the 
Federal government through the proposed Educational Opportunity 
Bank are the primary backers of this proposal.
The companion proposal of raising the tuition rates 
to near full-cost provides immediate relief to the financial
^Bolton, "Economics and Financing: Overview," pp. 82-3.
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problems of higher education institutions. At the present 
time, this proposal is in the process of full debate and 
its future is uncertain.
Johnstone presents the case for income contingent 
loans as resting on the following assumptions:
1) Tuitions, fees, and general costs of living 
borne by the student and/or his family will 
continue to rise.
2) Higher student/family costs will necessitate 
increasing reliance upon student borrowing.
3) Increasing reliance on student borrowing will 
require loan instruments which provide "more 
manageable" repayment terms than are currently 
available under conventional student loan pro­
grams .
4) At least some students will be more willing to 
borrow, and will be better able to handle larger 
debts, if provided with the opportunity to borrow 
under some form or forms of an income contingent 
loan.
5) Students should be provided with an opportunity 
to borrow under income contingent as well as 
conventional, fixed schedule loan contracts.^
Chambers warns that this proposal would perhaps " . . .
create a vast bureaucracy, larger, probably, than the huge
2social security system." He also adds that it is apparently 
a ploy ". . . t o  keep all higher education on a high-fee basis, 
and thus permit private colleges to 'live in the style to which
^D. Bruce Johnstone, New Patterns for College Lending: 
Income Contingent Loans (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972), pp. 13-17.
^Chambers, Who Pays? Who Gains?, p. 95.
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they have become accustomed,' while forcing public institu­
tions into a similar mold of financing.
Bolton warns that the program may become loaded with
"poor risks" since the students attracted to the plan may 
well be those students which expect a low income. He con­
currently suggests that the students whose incomes are expected 
to be high may find some other source of aid.
Tax Credits: Another recent proposal is in the form of a
tax credit for higher education expenses. In effect, it allows 
the student or his parents to deduct educational expenses, up 
to a stated maximum, from their Federal income tax obligation.
Bolton reports that some people oppose tax credits 
because they " . . .  give too much aid to high income families 
who don't need it and too little to poorer ones who do." He 
also states that some of its critics proposed it would " . . .  
be less useful in stimulating higher education than other possi­
ble uses of Federal f u n d s . C h a m b e r s  agrees with the latter 
point and adds that it ". . . would cost the government the
5loss of more than $1 billion annually in revenue . . . "
llbid.
91.
^Bolton, "Economics and Financing: Overview," pp. 90-
^Ibid.. p. 94.
^Ibid., p. 95.
^Chambers, Who Pays? Who Gains?, p. 95.
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He continues with, "For example, $1 billion would be ample 
to make all public universities entirely tuition-free."^
Voucher Plan; The Voucher Plan would provide grants (vouch­
ers) directly to low-income students to be used at any eli­
gible institution. The amount of the grant would be depen­
dent upon the ability of the student or his family to contri­
bute to the educational expenses of the student. Since the 
student may take the grant to any eligible institution (even 
private institutions), the institutions presumably are more 
competitive and diverse and the students enjoy a greater free­
dom of choice.
Since the grants would utilize a portion of the State 
appropriation, the tuition would be raised perhaps to full- 
cost to maintain the same level of institutional expenditure. 
The grants would then off-set the costs of education (even at 
the increased tuition level) for the low-income students, and 
provide them with an equal educational opportunity.
The primary issue for criticism and praise of the 
voucher plan is related to the concept that higher education 
institutions would become similar to marketplaces since stu­
dents could go where they wanted. In other words, the insti­
tutions would be offering programs in an attempt to attract 
students— not necessarily because the programs were needed. 
Balderston reminds; " . . .  major new fields and topics of
^Ibid.
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study have developed from breakthroughs in scholarly research 
and new perceptions of how to organize training for the pro­
fessions, not from swings in student a t t e n t i o n - f o c u s . H e  
adds later, however, that under certain conditions, the voucher 
system could increase the independence of the institutions and
" . . .  decrease the hazards of bureaucratic management of higher
2education budgets and of political intervention.
Low Tuition: Low tuition is by far the most wide-spread method
of providing financial assistance and equal opportunity to stu­
dents. Traditionally, the tuition has been low to provide 
equal opportunity. As Bowen summarized;
Traditionally in America, low tuitions have been 
advocated to 'keep open the doors of opportunity 
to aspiring young men and women.' The raising 
of tuitions has almost always been done reluctantly 
and only when other sources have proved inadequate.^
Has low tuition promoted greater opportunity for all
students? Hansen and Weisbrod are doubtful. They claim that
the uniform tuition rate provides a "windfall" for the more
financially able and does not help the lower-income student.^
Frederick E. Balderston, Financing Postsecondarv Edu­
cation: Statement to the Joint Committee on the Master Plan
for Higher Education of the California Legislature (Berkeley, 
California: University of California, 1972), p. 26.
^Ibid.
^Howard R. Bowen, "Tuitions and Student Loans in the 
Finance of Higher Education," in Economic Report, p. 624.
^Hansen and Weisbrod, "Search for Equity," p. 114.
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They also say;
Some low-income persons have benefitted handsomely 
from the availability of publicly-subsidized higher 
education. But on the whole, the effect of these 
subsidies is to promote greater rather than less 
inequality among people of various social and eco­
nomic backgrounds, by making available substantial 
subsidies that lower-income families are either not 
eligible for or cannot make use of because of other 
conditions and constraints associated with their 
income position.^
Cartter says it a little more succinctly: ". . . it can
be argued that low tuition is an inefficient means of distri­
buting aid.
The criticism of this type of student fee system is
increasing across the nation. As Orwig summarized:
But in addition to these incremental tuition 
increases resulting in part from the exigencies 
of public budget constraints, the low cost pub­
lic education model is increasingly criticized 
as an inequitable and an inefficient mechanism 
for the support of public higher education.3
Hanson and Weisbrod add that the low cost public education
model affects the distribution of students to the extent that
half can pay more than they do now and the other half often
goes deeply into debt— often dropping out of school because of
financial pressures. They also state that an additional group
of able young people cannot even enroll because of financial
problems.^ They continue later:
^Ibid.. pp. 122-23.
^Cartter, "Student Financial Aid," p. 115.
^Orwig, "Summarizing the Issues," p. 337.
^Hansen and Weisbrod, "Students and Parents," p. 118.
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Surely there must be some better system of financing 
higher education, one which avoids these results with­
out producing other undesirable effects.^
Summary
Historically administrators have been cognizant of the 
process of decision-making in the achievement of the goals of 
their organization. They also have been very zognizant of the 
power inherent in the process of budgeting operational funds 
toward the achievement of organizational goals.
American higher education, on the other hand, has been 
noticeably reticent in its awareness and application of these 
two processes. Perhaps because of the general nature of most 
goals of higher education or because of their conflicting nature, 
concrete methods of concurrently achieving most goals have not 
been articulated nor have operational funds been allocated 
toward their achievement.
Even some singular goals have not been achieved very 
well. For example, equality of opportunity has long been a 
goal of American higher education and student aid programs have 
been devised and implemented to aid in the achievement of this 
goal. For the most part, however, the student aid programs 
are fragmented and underfinanced and have generally failed in 





Design of the Model 
As stated in the objectives of this study, the student 
fee model must include two basic components— the weighting 
system and allocation system. The weighting system is required 
to provide each decision-maker with a systematic procedure he 
can use to derive the optimal mixture of goals he perceives 
his particular educational system should be trying to achieve. 
The allocation system is required to provide a means to allo­
cate funds toward the achievement of the goals as specified 
in the weighting system.
Definitions of Model Terminology 
In addition to the general definitions in the first 
chapter, there exist words and expressions utilized in the 
model design which have special definitions. These definitions 
are as follows;
Student Characteristics: Those attributes of a student
which are judged by the decision-maker to be important in the 
determination of his student fees and/or subsidy.
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Student Category: A set of students which display the
same student characteristic measures. Each unique combination 
of measures of student characteristics will constitute a dis­
tinct student category.
Criteria Weight; A real number, ranging from zero to 
one, assigned to each criteria (goal, subgoal, or student char­
acteristic) as a measure of perceived relative importance.
The general goals are represented as a hierarchy within 
which subgoals can be identified. These subgoals can continue 
to be subdivided, if necessary, until the lowest-level sub­
goals are measurable as student characteristics. A set of 
criteria weights is then established for all the sets of 
criteria.
The set of weights assigned to each set of criteria 
has a sum of one. This restriction has the effect of normal­
izing all the weights and of aiding the decision-maker in 
assigning the weights. Each weight which is assigned to a 
criterion is interpreted to be a measure of the relative impor­
tance of that criterion when compared to the other criterion 
within the same higher-level criterion. The relative impor­
tance between two criteria weights is equivalent fo the ratios 
of the assigned weights. For example, in a set of two criteria, 
where one is perceived to be three times as important as the 
other, the weights should be assigned as .75 and .25 respec­
tively.
Effective Weights; The effective weight for each stu­
dent characteristic is computed by multiplying together the 
"chain" of criteria weights associated with it. In other words.
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each assigned weight of every higher-level criteria which is 
associated with a student characteristic is involved in the 
product.
Total Worth Score; A total worth score is computed 
for each student category by summing the effective weights 
assigned to each of the student characteristics in the student 
category.
Design Criteria and Their Justification 
The objective of this study will be accomplished when 
the proposed student fee model satisfies the following design 
criteria :
1) The model must mathematically permit the consideration 
of an unlimited number of goals, subgoals, and student 
characteristics.
This criterion is needed to insure flexibility for each 
decision-maker. Some decision-making entities may desire to 
include only a few criteria whereas others may desire a highly 
complex and many-faceted decision model. In most cases this 
determination will probably be based upon the availability of 
appropriate data although political considerations may also be 
a factor.
2) The model must be designed such that a perceived ratio 
of relative importance between any two criteria in the 
same set can be multiplied by one criterion's weight
in order to determine the weight of the other criterion.
This criterion is needed to enable the decision-maker 
in establishing his criteria priorities and their relative 
importance to his particular realm of responsibility. By
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requiring this design criterion, the decision-maker can readily 
establish and adjust the measure of importance he assigned to 
any one criteria.
3) Each student's subsidy should vary proportionately 
with the cost of his degree program.
This design criterion is needed as an enabling crite­
rion for those decision-making entities with this particular 
philosophy and with the capability of program budgeting. In 
other words, the model should allow the philosophy of the sub­
sidy and/or fees varying with the degree program cost but yet 
it should not prescribe it. If a particular decision-making 
entity does not have degree program costs or if this is not 
one of its goals, then the various degree program costs can 
easily be replaced by an institution-wide average cost per 
student or some other such cost measure.
4) Each student's subsidy should vary proportionately 
as his total worth score varies.
This design criterion is obviously needed to establish 
the relationship between the worth scores, the subsidies, and 
the assessment of student fees. The worth scores are measures 
of importance to the decision-making entity so, if all other 
factors are held constant: the higher the total of a student's
worth score, the higher the subsidy; and the lower the total 
worth score, the lower the subsidy.
5) Each student's subsidy should vary proportionately 
as the amount of non-student-fee revenue varies.
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Since a basic assumption of this study is that the 
student pays fees to supplement constrained resources, the 
model must be designed such that the subsidies are allocated 
first and the fees are the difference in the subsidy and the 
cost. Therefore, the design of the model should insure that 
the higher the level of non-student-fee revenue; the higher 
the subsidy; and the lower the level of non-student-fee rev­
enue, the lower the subsidy.
6) Each student's fee should vary proportionately 
as the number of enrolled students varies.
The amount of non-student-fee funds is to be allocated
to the students in the form of subsidies. Therefore, for a
given amount of non-student-fee funds: as more students enroll,
the less the subsidy, and the greater the resultant fee; and
as less students enroll, the greater the subsidy, and the less
the resultant fee.
7) The model must combine the weighting system and the 
allocation system so that the decision-maker can vary 
the amount of subsidy toward any combination of stu­
dent characteristics.
This design criterion is needed to insure that the 
decision-maker can use the model as an allocative device to 
aid in the achievement of student-related goals.
The Weighting System 
The weighting system described herein is adapted from 
Miller's Professional Decision-Making.^ In his book. Miller
Ijames R. Miller, III, Professional Decision-Making 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).
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systemized and validated a procedure for evaluating complex 
alternatives. Miller developed the procedure to enable decision 
makers in their choice of an alternative when multiple conside­
rations are inherent in the decision process. Miller's pro­
cedure provides the decision-maker with "total worth scores" 
for each alternative which allows the decision-maker to select 
the alternative with the highest total worth score as the best 
alternative. The total worth score is the sum of the "effec­
tive weights" assigned to each alternative according to its 
perceived worth by the various criteria.
The primary adaptation of Miller's procedure for the 
weighting system as utilized in the student fee model is in 
the use of the total worth scores. Whereas Miller's procedure 
was designed to enable decision-makers to select one alterna­
tive based upon the highest worth score, the student fee model 
will use all the total worth scores as weights in the alloca­
tion system. The "alternatives" in the student fee model will 
be different student categories which represent sets of stu­
dents displaying identical student characteristics.
For example. Figure 1 demonstrates a sample hierarchy 
of goals, subgoals, and student characteristics which might be 
utilized in the student fee model. Each branch of the hier­
archy could be expanded or reduced depending upon the desires 
of the decision-maker or the availability of data.
In essence, the hierarchy in Figure 1 was constructed 
using the following procedure. The broad goals which were
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FIGURE 1
SAMPLE HIERARCHY OF GOALS, SUBGOALS, 
AND STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS
>.ucQ)
ACT score greater than or equal to 30 
Ability ACT score between 10 and 30
ACT score less than or equal to 10
Lower division
Level of instruction Upper division
Graduate
Very critical need 
Degree vs. manpower need Average need
O•HW-l
w
Surplus of available manpower














Per capita family income less than 
or equal to $3,000
Economic Per capita family income between 
$3,000 and $5,000
Per capita family income greater 
than or equal to $5,000
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deemed to be important were equity, equality of opportunity, 
and efficiency.
Efficiency was defined as societal economic efficiency. 
In other words, the goal of efficiency was established to sub­
sidize those students who would return a higher economic yield 
to society. Efficiency was subdivided into four subgoals: 
ability level of the student; level of study; probability of 
remaining in the state after graduation, and; the degree pro­
gram as it relates to manpower supply and demand.
Equality of opportunity was selected as a goal to 
expedite the removal of barriers which inhibit attendance in 
higher education. This goal was subdivided into three subgoals: 
race of the student; sex of the student, and; economic level of 
the student and/or his family.
The goal of equity was defined as a procedure whereby 
students would be granted subsidies and assessed student fees 
according to the set of criteria defined for the student-related 
goals of equality of opportunity and efficiency and identically 
applied to each student's unique combination of student charac­
teristics. The application of the model, therefore, constituted 
achievement of the goal of equity.
Each subgoal was assigned a measurable criteria which 
was a student characteristic. The subgoals and their related 
student characteristics are defined as follows :
Ability Level - High ability; those students with ACT scores
greater than or equal to 30.
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- Average ability; those student with 
ACT scores between 10 and 30.
- Low ability; those students with ACT 
scores less than or equal to 10
Level of Study- Lower division; freshman and sophomore
students
- Upper division; junior and senior students 
Graduate division; graduate students
Probability of Remaining in the State - High probability; in­
state residents 
- Low probability; out- 
of-state residents
Manpower Need - Very critical need for manpower from
student's degree program
- Average need for manpower from student's 
degree program
- Surplus of available manpower from 
student's degree program




Sex - Female student
- Male student
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Economie - Low income; those students whose family has an 
adjusted income of less than or equal to $3,000 
per family member
- Average income; those students whose family has 
an adjusted income of between $3,000 and $5,000 
per family member.
- High income; those students whose family has an
adjusted income of greater than or equal to
$5,000 per family member.
The weights for the hierarachy are assigned according 
to the desired relative importance of each set of goals, sub­
goals, and student characteristics at each branch of the hier­
archy. The weights for each set of criteria must be positive, 
and add to one. In Figure 2, for example, the two primary goals
of efficiency and equality of opportunity form a set of goals.
One goal was perceived to have a relative importance of one 
and one-half times the other —  so the goals were assigned weights 
of 0.40 and 0.60 (0.40 + 0.60 = 1).
Within the goal of equality of opportunity are three 
subgoals which form a set of subgoals —  they too are assigned 
positive weights such that their sum is one. The same tech­
nique is applied to the set of four subgoals of efficiency.
Then each subgoal's student characteristics are treated simi­
larly until, in this sample, each student characteristic has 
three weights associated with it —  the weight of the primary 
goal, the subgoal and its own. The effective weights for each
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of these three associated weights (e.g. Caucasian—  (e.g. .10 
X .10 X .10 = 0.006).
The Allocation System 
The following equation constitutes the allocation sys­
tem of the student fee model for each student in student cate­
gory p:
Cp«P
S F p  =  C p  -   --------------- A  . (1)
,£ NjCjWj
where :
SFp = student fee of each FTE student in student category p,
Cj = cost per FTE per academic year for the degree program 
in student category j.
Wj = total worth score for student category j.
Nj = number of FTE students in student category j.
A = amount of non-student-fee revenue to be allocated as 
subsidies,
m = the number of student categories in which students are 
enrolled.
In non-mathematical language, the student fee for each 
student in a given student category is determined by subtract­
ing the amount of the subsidy from the degree program cost.
The subsidy is computed by: multiplying the program cost by
the total worth score of the category; dividing the product 
by the sum of all such products which have been weighted or 
multiplied by the number of students in the respective categories;
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multiplying the quotient by the total amount of money to be 
allocated as subsidies.
Obviously, the subsidy, Sp, for each student in stu­
dent category p is
Sp = ■ <2>
E  N 4C 4W 4 
1=1
SO that the basic equation for determining a student's fee
agrees with the basic assumption that the student pays in fees
the difference between his program cost and his subsidy. By 
substituting equation (2) into equation (1), the basic equation 
becomes
SFp = Cp - Sp. (3)
Other derived equations are also obvious. For example, 
the sum of all subsidies must be equal to the total non-student- 
fee revenue;
^N . S .  = ^  -- 2 - 2 - 1 . . A = A . (4)
L  NjCjWj j=l J J J
Another equation indicates that the sum of the students in all 
m student categories constitute the total enrollment of the
educational entity:
m
^2 j = Total FTE Enrollment. (5)
i=i
The total budget needs of the educational entity is given by
the summation of all students' program cost:
m
Total Budget Needs = ^  (6)
j=l
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The total amount of student fee revenues is the sum of all stu­
dent fees :
m
Total Student Fee Revenue = ^  N.«SF.. (7)
j=l  ̂ ^
Methodology and Data Collection 
The methodology for testing the satisfaction of the 
design criteria will be by mathematical proofs. The design 
criteria will also be demonstrated by trial runs of the model 
on a sample institution. The various trial runs will serve 
primarily as examples to aid in the understanding and implemen­
tation of the model.
Description of Sample Institution 
For computation ease, a sample institution was constructed 
with five degree programs and 259 FTE students. Pertinent infor­
mation relative to the sample institution is displayed in Table 
2. The hierarchy of goals and student characteristics which 
were utilized in the weighting system for the trial runs is 
displayed in Figure 3. The student characteristics utilized in 
the trial runs were arbitrarily distributed over the enrollment 
in the five programs to provide a range of combinations of char­
acteristics. This distribution is displayed in Table 3. The 
level of funding of non-student-fee revenue allocated as sub­
sidies was set at approximately 75 per cent of the total budget 
needs of $333,098 or $250,000.
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FIGURE 3
HIERARCHY OF GOALS, SUBGOALS AND STUDENT 
CHARACTERISTICS^ UTILIZED IN TRIAL 
RUNS OF STUDENT FEE MODEL
‘W  > 1  0 -P•M
Per capita family income less than or equal to $3,000 (low)
Per capita family income between $3,000 and $5,000 (average)
(0•p
g





Very critical need (critical)
Degree
program
Probability In-state resident (in-state) 
of remaining
Average need (average)
Surplus of available manpower (surplus)
in state
Out-of-state resident (out-of-state)
ACT score greater than or equal to 30 (high)
Ability ACT score between 10 and 30 (average)
ACT score less than or equal to 10 (low)
®See pages 51-53 for precise definitions of criteria,
^Words in parenthesis indicate abbreviations used in tables 
for the corresponding student characteristics.
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Purpose and Explanation of Trial Runs 
As stated earlier, the trial runs provide guidance in 
the implementation of the student fee model while simultan­
eously demonstrating its flexibility. The various trial runs 
demonstrate the effect on subsidies and fees of different 
weights assigned to the goals, subgoals, and student character­
istics. The financial and enrollment data and the distribution 
of student characteristics are held constant throughout the 
trial runs.
For computational ease, only a portion of the criteria 
have been selected from Figure 1 to be used in the trial runs.
The goals, subgoals, and student characteristics which were 
selected allows 54 different combinations (3 X 3 X 3 X 2 = 54) of 
student characteristics. This number combined with the five 
different program costs allows 270 (5 X 54 = 270) different
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student categories. This number of student categories was 
sufficient to demonstrate the flexibility of the model.
The results of the trial runs and pertinent and related 
data are contained in Appendix A through Appendix E. Table 1 
of each appendix shows the goals, subgoals and student charac­
teristics with their assigned weights and effective weights.
Table 2 of each appendix shows the distribution of effective 
weights and the computation of the total worth scores for 
each of the student categories in which students are enrolled. 
Table 3 of each appendix displays the data involved in the 
computation and the resultant subsidies and student fees for 
each student in each student category.
In addition. Appendix F displays in one table the results 
of all five trial runs. It is suggested, however, that the 
reader read the appropriate sections in Chapter IV describing 
the trial runs before consulting Appendix F.
TABLE 3








Income Manpower Need Residence Ability
low avg high critical avg surplus instate
out-of
state high avg low
Accounting 19 3 13 3 19 0 0 18 1 3 15 1
Chemistry 21 4 14 3 0 21 0 20 1 1 17 3
Elementary Education 154 26 97 31 0 0 154 144 10 3 142 9
Management 8 1 6 1 0 8 0 7 1 0 7 1
History 57 10 34 13 0 57 0 54 3 0 56 1
Institution 259 44 164 51 19 86 154 243 16 5 239 15
CTi
CHAPTER IV
SATISFACTION OF DESIGN CRITERIA AND DEMONSTRATION 
OF THE STUDENT FEE MODEL
This chapter is devoted to showing satisfaction of the 
design criteria and displaying the results and analyses of the 
trial runs. As was indicated in the previous chapter, the 
design criteria can be shown to be satisfied by mathematical 
proofs. These proofs are contained in the next section. The 
data, calculations and results of the trial runs are contained 
in the appendices. Pertinent summaries, analyses and comments 
are contained in this chapter as aids to the understanding and 
application of the student fee model.
Satisfaction of Design Criteria 
Design Criterion 1 ; The model must mathematically permit the 
consideration of an unlimited number of goals, subgoals, and 
student characteristics.
Since the weighting scheme is the same for goals, sub­
goals, and student characteristics, it will be sufficient to 
prove that the model will mathematically permit an unlimited 




Given n goals (n>l) with corresponding weights ,
n
W 2 , . where 0 < W j <  1 and Y, Wj = 1, prove there can
j=l
exist n + 1 goals with weights Gj such that O ^ G j ^ l  and 
n+1
C  G j = 1. 
j=l
Obviously there exist two such weights. For example, 
0.50 + 0.50 = 1.
Assume for some particular n = k that + W 2 + ... + = 1.
Now pick any Wj, say Wg, then for any real number m > l
= TT ' ^  - 1) -
Therefore, + # 2  + ... + Wg + ... + + # 2  + ...
w w+ __s_ + (xn - 1) _s + ... + W% = 1, which means there exists k + 1 m m
k+1
terms Gj; whereîjj  0 <.G^<2 1 and ^  Gz = 1. J J j=i J
Ic
Therefore, if there exist an n = k for which ^  W j = 1 and
j=l k+1
O ^ W j ^I, there also exist an n = k + 1 for which ^ G 4  = 1
j=l
and O'^Gj^Il. Since it is true for n = 2, as shown above, it 
is true for n = 2 + 1 = 3, etc.
Design Criterion 2; The model must be designed such that a 
perceived ratio of relative importance between any two criteria 
in the same set can be multiplied by one criterion's weight in 
order to determine the weight of the other criterion.
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Let {g^} represent a sequence of n criteria ranked in 
descending order of importance. Let jm^j i = 2 , 3,...,n} 
represent the perceived ratios of relative importance between 
any two criteria Gp and Gg such that mp = ^  and where 0 < m ^
< 1. Proof is needed that there exists a sequence of real
numbers | | corresponding to { | , where 0<aj<-l and ap
n .
= mp.aq such that Z^a-i = 1.
i=i
Pick any real number X >0.
Then there exists a sequence X, Xm 2 « Xm^, ...» Xm^ 
whose sum can be denoted as a positive number K;
then I  + ^ 2  + ^ 3  + • • • + ^ n  
Since 0<C^<1 and 0<,m£^l then 0 ^ ^ ^ ^  1 for all i.
Therefore, if we let a^ = ^  and aj = for j = i, then there 
does exist a sequence of real numbers ja^} such that a^ = mpSg
n
and
X  +  X m 2  +  X m g  +  ... +  X m ^  =  K,
= 1.
0 a - C  1 and where ^  a . = 1.
 ̂ . j=l ^
Design Criterion 3; Each student's subsidy should vary propor­
tionately with the cost of his degree program.
From equation (2) in Chapter 3, the subsidy Sp for all 




V p . = _____________ = p " p ^
m p- 1 m
Z  N.C.W. 2  NjCjWj + NpCpWp + Z  NjCjWj
j=l i=l ^ ^ ^ j=p+l
There are two limits on the program cost: it can
increase indefinitely (i.e., Cp 'oo ) or it can approach
zero (i.e., Cp -> 0) . Therefore, if Cp 0, then
l im S p  = liiti ^ p ^ p ^
Cp ^  0 Cp -> 0 p_i m
+ V p”p  +
p- 1 m
Z  N.C^W. + 0 + Z  N-jC^W. 
j=i i=p+i
If Cp oo , then
lim Sp= lim CpWpA
= lim WpA
C, j p— 1 \ / m \
( I N j C ^ w J  f  Cp + NpWp + L 4  Cp
. V  ■
0 + NpWp + 0  Np
Therefore, as the program cost of a particular student
category varies from zero to infinity, the subsidy for each
student in the student category will vary from zero to an equal 
share of the total non-student-fee revenue with other students
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in the same category.
Design Criterion 4 : Each student's subsidy should vary pro­
portionately as his total worth score varies.
Since the total worth score Wp for student category 
p has the same type of influence in equation (2) of Chapter 
3 as the program cost, Cp, this proof would be identical to 
the proof for design Criterion 3 and will not be repeated 
here. See the proof of design Criterion 7 for the range of 
subsidy values as Wp varies.
Design Criterion 5 : Each student's subsidy should vary pro­
portionately as the amount"^'f non-student fee revenue varies.
The amount of non-student-fee revenue. A, can increase 
indefinitely (i.e., A ->«>o) or it can approach zero (i.e., A 
-> 0). From equation (2) in Chapter 3, if A 4 0 then
c w Alim Sp = lim P P = 0 .
A - ^ 0  A 0 m
r  NjCjWj 
3=1
If A £50# then
lim Sp = lim ^P^P^ = OOA->oo m
S  N . C . W .  2  N j C j W j
j=l J 1 J j=l J J J
Therefore, as the non-student-fee revenue decreases 
towards zero each student's subsidy will approach zero. Simi­
larly, as the non-student-fee revenue increases indefinitely, 
each student's subsidy will increase indefinitely.
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Design Criterion 6 : Each student's fee should vary proportion­
ately as the number of enrolled students varies.
From equation (1) in Chapter 3, the student fee for 
student category p is
SF = C -  P _ P _  . A .
^ ^ m
j=l
Conceptually, the number of enrolled students can
m
increase indefinitely (i.e., ^  N . bo ) or it can decrease
j=i ^m m
towards one (i.e., 2  ->!)• Furthermore, if ^  then
j=l j=l ̂m
Nt GO for at least one j; and if Z  N- 4  1 then -A 1 for
J i=l J
some one j, call it p.
m
Therefore, if ^  N-; oo , then
j=l
lim SFp lim / CpWpA \
m = m I C_,-------------------------- I
3=1
lim Cp lim
m - m m
= ZN-;->c>o Z  NjCjW^
j=l j=l j=l
CpWpA
= Cp - = Cp - 0 = Cp
If the student fee model is to allocate subsidies to 
students and assess student fees, there needs to exist at least 
one student.
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If 2 ^ 1  1, then
1=1 ^
mlim SFp ^ ^lim Cp _ ^lim CpWpA
Z  Nj ^ 1  E  Nj -> 1 E  Nj ^  1 "IT—
 ̂ i-i i-i 2
i=i ] ] ]
CpWpA
Therefore, as the number of enrolled students increases 
indefinitely, each students' fee approaches the program cost 
of his student category. As the number of enrolled students 
decreases toward one, each enrolled student's fee approaches 
a subsidy which is equal to the difference in his program cost 
and the amount of non-student-fee revenue.
Design Criterion 7 ; The model must combine the weighting 
system and the allocation system so that the decision-maker 
can vary the amount of subsidy toward any combination of stu­
dent characteristics.
Each student category represents a unique combination 
of student characteristics. Any particular student category 
p is represented by the total worth score of Wp and the mini­
mum and maximum values for Wp are zero and one respectively. 
Before proving the design criteria, proof is needed of: 
if Wp 1 then W j  0 where jT^p, 
and if Wp 0 then W j  1 for at least one j^p.
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Suppose the sequence of all n effective weights is
j e„ I where ^ e ^  = 1 and where je^j represents the weight 
' i=l ' ' / Aof n possible student characteristics. Partition <®n / into
t sets of student characteristic effective weights such that
from each set one and only one effective weight can be assigned
to any student in student category p such that:
Si - e]̂ , 6 2 , . • •/
>2 - ®a^ + 1 , * • * ' ®a2 '
+ 1' s- 1
When Wp = ^  eg where eg is the effective weight assigned 
s=l
to student category p from partion Sg. It is easily seen, there-
t n
fore, that if Wp 1 then ^ e g  * 1 and since ej_ = 1 then
s=l i=l
n
^ e i  4  0 for all i 7̂  s and W-; 0 for all j ^ p.
i=l
t n
Similarly, if W ■) 0 then X, e„ -> 0 and since e.- = 1
P s = l  °  i t l
n n
then C  1 for all i ^ s. If ^  e^ 1 for i ^ s, then
i=l i=l
there must exist at least one Wg, q p such that Wg increased
toward one (i.e., Wg 4  1 ).
Therefore, to prove design Criterion 7, from equation 
(2) of Chapter 3, if Wp -> 1, then
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lim Sp = lim ______________
Wp 1 Wp ^  1 p-1 m
N p C p W p  +  2  N . C - W .  +  E  N j C j W j
j ^ l  J J J j = p + l - ’
C p  • 1 • A  _  C p A  _  ^
NpCp* 1 + 0 + 0  NpCp Np
Similarly, if Wp -> 0, then
lim Sp = lim C p W p A
Wp 4  0 W  0 p-l m
N p C p « p +  ,Z: NjCjWj+ 2  ayCjWj 
3=1 ]=p+l
0=   = 0 .
0 +  N q  • C q  • 1 +  0
Therefore, as the worth score for any particular com­
bination of student characteristics approaches one, the sub­
sidy for each student in the student category approaches an 
equal share of the non-student-fee revenue with the other stu­
dents in the same student category. As the worth score for 
any particular combination of student characteristics approaches 
zero, each student's subsidy in the student category approaches 
zero.
Demonstration of the Student Fee Model 
The intent of this section is to provide guidance in 
the application of the student fee model. Guidance is needed 
particularly in the adjustment of weights to produce the desired 
range of student fees.
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The trial runs contained in the appendices are examples 
of the effects of differently assigned weights. The reader 
should be cautioned in trying to trace the effect of a par­
ticular shift in weights from one trial run to another because 
of the "trade-off effect." The "trade-off effect" originates 
from the fact that to add weight to one criteria means the 
weight has to be subtracted from another. Since every student 
category contains four student characteristics, it is possible, 
from one trial to another, for the expected effect on a par­
ticular student category to be muted because of the offsetting 
effect of another characteristic's decreased weight.
Properties of the Model 
The weighting system can be adjusted more effectively 
and the "trade-off effect" used to an advantage if the follow­
ing properties of the weighting system are understood:
1) Each goal and subgoal have imbedded in them opposing 
student characteristics so that the weights for the 
goals and subgoals have to be adjusted in conjunction 
with the weights for the student characteristics.
2) The allocation of subsidies and the subsequent 
assessment of student fees in a particular student 
category is determined by the relative impact of the 
student category.
3) The relative impact of a student category is affected 
by: its program cost; its FTE enrollment; its total
worth score; the total impact of all student categories,
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4) The total impact of all student categories will
change as the criteria weights are adjusted because 
of the distribution of students with new total worth 
scores.
Explanation and Demonstration of Model Properties
Property 1 ; The student fee model is designed to allow 
decision-makers the opportunity of targeting the allocations 
at particular types or groups of students (low-income students, 
for example). An opposing student characteristic of low-income 
students would be high-income students. Thus, if the weight 
assigned to the goal of equality of opportunity is raised, 
with the purpose of lowering fees for low-income students, 
without a concurrent lowering of student characteristic weight 
for high-income students, the net effect is likely to assess 
lower student fees for high-income students also.
For example. Trial A assigned weights of 0.50 to both 
of the primary goals while Trial B assigned weights of 0.40 
and 0.60 to the goals of efficiency and equality of opportunity, 
respectively. All other weights and factors were held constant 
so that the effect of this adjustment could be analyzed. As 
shown in Table 4, all low income students did have lower fees 
in Trial B as compared to Trial A. But so did three high- 
income students. Furthermore, sixty-five average income stu­
dents suffered higher fees in Trial B than in Trial A.
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TABLE 4
THE EFFECT ON FEES PER STUDENT CREDIT HOUR (SCH) 
OF ADJUSTING WEIGHTS IN TRIAL B TO 
FAVOR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY^












income 44 $-1.00 $3.70 $14.27 $-2.67 $1.80 $10.83
average
income 164 8.17 11.37 33.10 8.67 11.50 30.00
high
income 51 10.83 14.87 26.33 13.10 15.93 26.33
Data compiled from Appendix F.
The average fees in Table 5 indicate an adequate res­
ponse to the weighting system even though the weights for the 
goals or subgoals were not adjusted— only the student charac­
teristic weights. The highest fees for the student character­
istics of critical degree and in-state residence did not steadily 
decrease, however, as might have been expected.
The increasing highest fees for the critical degree 
characteristic are the result of the "trade-off effect." Each 
of the highest fees are the fees of student category number one 
(see Appendix F) which includes the additional characteristics 
of average income, out-of-state residence, and average ability. 
Each of these additional characteristics lost weight in the 
adjustments to the extent that it negated the added weight
TABLE 5
EFFECTS IN STUDENT FEES PER STUDENT CREDIT HOUR^ OF WEIGHTS INCREASING 
IN TRIAL D AND E TO FAVOR STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS OF 
LOW-INCOME, CRITICAL DEGREE AND IN-STATE STUDENTS^
Student No.of
FTE





















44 $0.57 $5.37 $17.17 $-9.93 $-0.33 $17.13 $-19.00 $-4.33 $15.77
critical
degree 19 0.57 11.13 28.67 -9.93 9.30 36.17 -19.00 5.97 38.40
in­
state 241 0.57 10.03 22.60 -9.93 9.67 26.50 -19.00 9.50 25.43
Data compiled from Appendix F.
See Appendices C, D, and E for the weights assigned in trials 
C, D, and E, respectively.
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assigned for the critical degree characteristic.
The fluctuation of the highest fee in the student char­
acteristic of in-state is caused by the second weighting system 
property.
Property 2 ; The impact of a student category in the allocation 
system is the result of the product of the number of students, 
the total worth score, and the program cost. In the various 
trial runs, however, the total worth score is the only varying 
factor since program cost and number of students are held con­
stant throughout the trials. When the total worth score of a 
student category changes, its impact changes. As the impact 
of each student category changes, the total of all the impacts 
also changes. Therefore, in the allocation system, a slight 
change in the impact of a particular student category may be 
offset by a relatively larger change in the total impact.
For example, as shown in Table 6, the highest fee in 
the student characteristic of in-state fluctuated from $22.60 
in Trial C to $26.50 in Trial D to $25.43 in Trial E. The 
corresponding student category impacts for each of the trials 
was 852, 846, and 852 respectively— very little change. The 
total impact for each trial was, however, 148,637, 160,697 and 
157,807, respectively. The ratios of each of the category 
impacts with the corresponding total impact times the appro­
priation of $250,000 gave the resultant subsidy. The subsidy 
subtracted from the program cost of $2,110 resulted in the 
total student fee. It is easily seen in Table 6 that the impact
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of the student category relative to the total impact as measured 
by the ratio of impacts is basic to the determination of the 
student fee in each trial run. A larger ratio means a larger 
subsidy and a lower fee. It should be noted that this is a 
problem only on comparisons of trial runs. Within each trial 
run the desired effect took place— the student categories 
with more impact received more subsidy.
TABLE 6
A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECT OF THE TOTAL IMPACT 
ON THE ASSESSMENT OF STUDENT FEES IN














C 0.404 852 148,637 0.00573 $1432 $678 $22.60
D 0.401 846 160,697 0.00526 1315 795 26.50
E 0.404 852 157,807 0.00540 1347 763 25.43
Note : Data compiled from Table 3 of Appendices C, D, and E
and from Appendix F.
Property 3 ; The results of the five trial runs and the explana­
tion in the preceding section effectively explain the changes 
in the relative impact as adjustments occur in the total worth 
scores. If, in other trial runs, similar adjustments were made 
in program cost or enrollment while holding constant the remain­
ing factors, the relative impacts would similarly change because 
of the effect of the change in the total impact.
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In the actual application of the student fee model, 
program costs would change from year to year as enrollments, 
efficiency of operation, and inflation changed and as programs 
were added and deleted. Hopefully, the appropriations from 
government and other non-student-fee revenues would keep pace 
with the increasing enrollments and inflation. The net effect 
would be a degree of uncertainty of the required fees from 
year to year until the enrollment process was completed and 
all data in. Unless an administrative procedure is devised 
to curtail the uncertainty (such as possibly a guarantee to 
each student to not raise his fees for a four-year period— if 
his characteristics did not change; or standard program costs), 
the students would need to be convinced that the student fee 
model would treat them more equitably than the former system. 
Institutions without program cost data would not be faced 
with this problem since they would be using an average cost 
per student applied all programs.
Seemingly, students are constantly changing programs 
in the present system of higher education. This type of enroll­
ment fluctuation would not adversely affect the use of the 
model since most changes of this nature tend to cancel each 
other. It is hypothetically possible, however, with the use 
of the model, to create a mass migration of students from high 
cost programs to low cost programs. If this happened, the 
decision-makers could easily adjust the weighting system to 
impede the flow of students.
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Property 4 ; This property is fairly obvious after reviewing 
the five trials and Table 6. In all five trials the total 
impacts changed as the total worth scores changed.
To an applicator of the student fee model, this prop­
erty will have one meaning as he adjusts the goal and student 
characteristic weights: a percentage variance in the total
worth score of a student category does not mean a like per­
centage variance in the assessment of student fees. The appli­
cator will have to know enrollments, program costs and total 
worth scores for all student categories and the amount of 
funds to be allocated as subsidies before he can precisely 
assess the fees to be paid by students. He should, however, 
with proper historical profiles of student characteristics, 
be able to predict the student fees for the various student 
categories with some degree of accuracy.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
In a time of financial crisis in higher education, 
planning for efficiency and economy must be demonstrated at 
all levels. The proposed student fee model establishes a 
financing structure for higher education which will encourage 
planning at all levels and which will encourage the efficient 
use of all available resources.
The proposed student fee model promotes efficiency 
and planning at the societal level because it encourages the 
assessment of societal higher education goals and provides 
the structure for directing societal funds toward the achieve­
ment of those goals. The proposed model should prove to be 
more efficient in the allocation process and to involve more 
planning than the present low-tuition system which distributes 
aid equally but indiscriminately to all students and indis­
criminately with regard to the goals of society.
Under widespread use of the model, institutions will 
be encouraged to plan and to promote economies since they will 
be competing with other institutions for students. With the 
use of the model, it is possible to envision a system whereby
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each institution would have its own unique cost for each pro­
gram which would be based on its actual costs and the insti­
tution's plan for improvement. The students, as they would 
complete enrollment at a particular institution, would pay 
the difference between the unique institutional program cost 
and their subsidy for the particular program in which they 
would enroll. Since the subsidy to a student would be essen­
tially the same regardless of the institution in which he 
enrolled, each institution with comparative higher cost pro­
grams would have to be prepared to defend them (on perhaps a 
quality basis) or would have to initiate economies to align 
their program costs with other competing institutions.
It should also be noted that the proposed student fee 
model should not infringe either on individual citizen's free­
dom of choice, or on diversity, or on institutional autonomy—  
but rather it should encourage all three since it will provide 
full funding for instructional programs. The proposed student 
fee model does, however, imply rather forcefully that societal 
funds will be directed toward the achievement of goals of 
society rather than being allocated indiscriminately. The stu­
dents, their parents, and institutions can pursue their own 
goals if they are willing to pay their own way for the portion 
of their goals which are incompatible with societal goals.
The student fee model offers an advantage over 
other financial aid programs because of its flexibility.
Almost all other financial aid programs are single-purposed;
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that is, they are designed to direct aid to only one segment 
of society. The student fee model, however, can be single or 
multiple-purposed depending upon the desires of the decision­
makers. The model can be adapted so that any educational 
entity, (Federal, State, or institutional) with the appropri­
ate central agency can use the model to implement the unique 
decisions of that entity relative to the goals of higher edu­
cation they wish to fund.
Implementation of the student fee model could possibly
release funds from other student aid programs to aid students
with unusual financial problems (costly and extended sickness,
for example) and to aid students with their living expenses
or other education-related expenses. Widespread use of the
student fee model with a concurrent redirection of existing
student aid programs could achieve a compromise version of
universal higher education. Hausman relates:
Assuming that society chooses universal higher educa­
tion as the best means for meeting certain goals it 
selects, there are a number of ways to achieve and 
pay for universal higher education. Any method (or 
combination of methods) must face at least these tests: 
efficiency, affordibility, equity, and effectiveness.
And, far from least, it must be politically realistic.^
Efficiency, equity, and effectiveness have already 
been discussed. Since the student fee model utilizes exist­
ing non-student-fee revenues through more efficient alloca­
tion of subsidies, it passes the test of affordibility. 
Whether the student fee model is politically realistic
^Hausman, "Pressures, Benefits, and Options," p. 14.
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remains for the decision-makers evaluation.
The primary assumption of the student fee model is 
that, ideally, society should provide full funding for higher 
education. If, however, sufficient funds are not available 
for full funding, society should strive to direct its limited 
funds toward higher education goals that are beneficial to 
society and not allocate the funds indiscriminately. This 
obviously requires an increased planning effort. The Carnegie 
Commission urges more state-wide planning in higher education 
and then adds comments consistent with the thrust of the pro­
posed student fee model.
In its broadest sense, state-wide planning must first 
be concerned with sets of goals: the economic and
social goals of the state, the goals of the educa­
tional system and its institutions, the goals of the 
individuals within the system, and the interaction 
among these sets of goals. Then planning must be 
addressed to the optimum allocation of resources to 
accomplish the desired ends.l
Conclusions
Based upon the satisfaction of the design criteria and 
the results of the trial runs, the following are the conclu­
sions of this study:
1) The proposed student fee model will permit the incor­
poration of an unlimited number of student related 
criteria and allocate subsidies and assess student 
fees toward their achievement.
^Carnegie Commission, "Capitol and the Campus," p. 31
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2) The proposed student fee model will permit and 
encourage the establishment of priorities and 
relative importance of student-related criteria 
and allocate subsidies and assess student fees 
toward their achievement.
3) The proposed student fee model will vary each 
student's subsidy proportionately with the cost 
of his degree program.
4) By varying the assignment of relative importance 
of criteria priorities, the proposed student fee 
model will vary the allocation of subsidies 
from non-student-fee revenue from zero to equal 
shares for all students possessing a particular 
combination of student characteristics.
5) The proposed student fee model will vary each 
student's subsidy proportionately with the amount 
of non-student-fee revenue.
6) The proposed student fee model will vary each 
student's fee proportionately with the number of 
enrolled students.
Implications
Implementation of the student fee model will have 
implications for American higher education in two vital direc­
tions. First, it will restructure higher education in a way 
which will: (1) allow pressures to intensify for account­
ability, (2) localize responsibility, (3) add new pressures
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for additional financing of higher education, (4) provide a 
mechanism for the optimum merger of public and private higher 
education. Secondly, the student fee model will have impli­
cations for further research and planning.
Implications for Restructuring Higher Education
Lawrence describes the three aspects of the new con­
cept of accountability as: intention, effectiveness, and
efficiency.^ Effectiveness and efficiency are well known 
terms but intention is elaborated on by Lawrence as: "Inten­
tion appears to be an important aspect in the new account­
ability since the shortage of resources has dictated that not 
all desirable things can be done, thus requiring priorities 
to be set."^
The proposed student fee model opens the prospect of 
accountability in all three aspects. Since the goals, sub­
goals, and student characteristics are clearly stated and 
weighted, the aspect of intention can be realized. By allo­
cating resources toward the stated goals, efficiency can be 
realized. And by gathering data on individual students, 
effectiveness can be evaluated and achieved more quickly.
Furthermore, if the institutions are competing with 
each other for students, the institutions will have to be 
accountable to students. Since the student fee model stresses
^Lawrence, "Issues Related to Purposes," p. 12.
2lbid.
85
decision-making in the realm of responsibility of the decision­
makers, responsibility and accountability will be localized. 
Henry establishes the guidelines for localized responsibility 
as :
Planning should not be left to politics, internal or 
external. Furthermore, it is not a democratic process.
Ideas and suggestions should come from all sides, but 
the analysis should rest in professional hands. Final 
judgements should be left to those who are responsible 
for living with the results of their recommendations 
and for exercising their accountability to the broad 
public, . . .1
The student fee model will also add new pressures for 
additional financing of public higher education since it will 
define legislative appropriations as subsidies to reduce the 
student's expenses. For example, instead of a legislature 
deciding on the addition of $5 million to an abstract entity 
like higher education, it will be deciding on the additional 
average subsidy to each full time student of, say, $100. It 
is presumed that students and their parents would be more 
inclined to call or write their legislator in the latter situa­
tion than in the former.
The weighting system of the student fee model is par­
ticularly adaptable to the merger of private and public higher 
education. Federal or State agencies considering such a mer­
ger, can add goals or subgoals for attendance in private insti­
tutions at any desired level of importance
^David D. Henry, "Accountability: To Whom, For What,
By What Means," in Educational Record, (Fall, 1972), p. 290.
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Implications for Further Research and Planning 
The implementation of the student fee model will 
accelerate the planning and research necessary to initiate 
economies in institutions of higher education. As was stated 
earlier, a student faced with a high cost degree program at 
one institution and a low cost but similar degree program at 
another institution may have to be convinced to enroll in the 
high cost program. The institutions with high cost programs 
will probably either have to sell their programs as high 
quality or initiate economies to become more competitive 
with other institutions. In either case, self-evaluation 
and more precise planning of budget needs will be initiated.
Research should also be accelerated in areas involving 
needs and goals of higher education. Particularly, the goals 
and needs of the prospective students in the area of influence 
or realm of responsibility of the institution. In addition, 
research will be needed on individual student characteristics. 
For example, in any particular geographical area; what should 
the per capita family income levels be in the model to insure 
euqality of opportunity; or, what degree programs should be 
subsidized to fill a critical manpower need; or, what are the 
critical manpower needs?
Localized enrollment procedures will have to be estab­
lished and refined. Appendix G demonstrates an administrative
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procedure for a particular state network of higher education 
institutions; but every educational entity with different laws 
may have different procedures and refinements.
Finally, evaluation will be accelerated to test the 
effectiveness of the student characteristic measures in the 
achievement of the goals. New data bases containing precise 
student information will enable evaluators and researchers 
the opportunity to collect historical data and to have a 
broader data base for their future research.
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TABLE A-1
CRITERIA WEIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE WEIGHTS FOR TRIAL A
Criteria
Equality of Opportunity
Income less than or 
equal to $3,000
Income between $3,000 
and $5,000
Income greater than 
or equal to $5,000
Efficiency
Degree Program
Very critical need 
Average need
Surplus of available manpower




ACT score greater than or 
equal to 30
ACT score between 10 and 30









































DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS TO STUDENT CATEGORIES 



































1 Accounting critical .075 out-of-state .050 avg. .040 avg. . 150 .315
2 critical .075 in-state . 200 high .050 low .250 .575
3 critical .075 in-state . 200 avg. .040 avg. .150 .465
4 critical .075 in-state . 200 avg. .040 high -100 .415
5 critical . 075 in-state .200 low .010 avg. .150 .435
6 History avg. .060 out-of-state .050 avg. .040 low .250 .400
7 avg. .060 out-of-state .050 avg. .040 avg. . 150 .300
8 avg. .060 out-of-state .050 avg. .040 high .100 .250
9 avg. .060 in-state .200 avg. .040 low .250 .550
10 avg. .060 in-state .200 avg. .040 avg. .150 .450
11 avg. .060 in-state .200 avg. .040 high .100 .400
12 avg. .060 in-state .200 low .010 avg. .150 .420
13 Chemistry avg. .060 out-of-state .050 avg. .040 avg. .150 .300
14 avg. .060 in-state .200 high .050 avg. .150 .460
15 avg, .060 in-state .200 avg. .040 low .250 .550
16 avg. .060 in-state .200 avg. .040 avg. .150 .450
17 avg. .060 in-state .200 avg. .040 high .100 .400
18 avg. .060 in-state . 200 low .010 low .250 .520
19 avg. .060 in-state .200 low .010 avg. .150 .420
20 avg. .060 in-state .200 low .010 high . 100 .370
kOœ
(continued)
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Sgee Chapter 4 and Table A-1 for an explanation of these criteria and their 
effective weights.

















CjWj Subs idy Per FTE
Net Fee 
Per FTE
1 1 $1842 .315 580 $1025 $8172 3 1842 .575 1059 1872 -303 11 1842 .465 856 1512 3304 3 1842 .415 764 1350 4925 1 1842 .435 801 1415 4276 1 1190 .400 476 840 3507 1 1190 .300 357 630 5608 1 1190 .250 297 525 6659 9 1190 .550 654 1155 3510 32 1190 .450 535 945 24511 12 1190 .400 476 840 35012 1 1190 .420 499 882 30813 1 2110 .300 633 1117 99314 1 2110 .460 970 1715 39515 3 2110 .550 1160 2050 6016 11 2110 .450 949 1677 43317 2 2110 .400 844 1492 61818 1 2110 .520 1097 1940 17019 1 2110 .420 886 1565 54520 1 2110 .370 780 1377 73321 1 1300 .300 390 687 61322 1 1300 .550 715 1262 3823 4 1300 .450 585 1032 26824 1 1300 .400 520 917 38325 1 1300 .420 546 965 33526 2 1140 .355 404 712 42827 6 1140 .255 290 512 62828 2 1140 .175 199 350 79029 2 1140 .415 473 835 30530 1 1140 .365 416 735 40531 23 1140 .505 575 1015 12532 84 1140 .405 461 815 32533 27 1140 .355 404 712 42834 1 1140 .475 541 955 18535 5 1140 .375 427 755 38536 1 1140 .325 370 652 488
From Table A-2
Note: Total Impact = 141,308
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TABLE B-1
CRITERIA WEIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE WEIGHTS FOR TRIAL B
Criteria
Equality of Opportunity
Income less than or 
equal to $3,000
Income between $3,000 
and $5,000
Income greater than 
or equal to $5,000
Efficiency
Degree Program
Very critical need 
Average need
Surplus of available manpower




ACT score greater than or 
equal to 30
ACT score between 10 and 30









































DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS TO STUDENT CATEGORIES 
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^See Chapter 4 and Table B-1 for an explanation of these criteria and their 
effective weights.

















CjWj Subsidy Per FTE
Net Fee 
Per FTE
1 1 $1842 .312 574 $1070 $7722 3 1842 .560 1031 1922 -803 11 1842 .432 795 1482 3604 3 1842 .372 685 1277 5655 1 1842 .408 751 1400 4426 1 1190 .420 499 930 2607 1 1190 .300 357 665 5258 1 1190 .240 285 530 6609 9 1190 .540 642 1197 -710 32 1190 .420 499 930 26011 12 1190 .360 428 797 39312 1 1190 .396 471 877 31313 1 2110 .308 649 1210 90014 1 2110 .428 903 1682 42815 3 2110 .540 1139 2125 -1516 11 2110 .420 886 1652 45817 2 2110 .360 759 1415 69518 1 2110 .516 1088 2027 8319 1 2110 .396 835 1557 55320 1 2110 .336 708 1320 79021 1 1300 . 300 390 727 57322 1 1300 .540 702 1307 -723 4 1300 .420 546 1017 28324 1 1300 .360 468 872 42825 1 1300 .396 514 957 34326 2 1140 .384 437 815 32527 6 1140 .264 300 557 58328 2 1140 .180 205 380 760
29 2 1140 .392 446 830 310
30 1 1140 .332 378 705 435
31 23 1140 .504 574 1070 7032 84 1140 .384 437 815 32533 27 1140 .324 369 687 45334 1 1140 .480 547 1020 12035 5 1140 .360 410 762 37836 1 1140 .300 342 637 503
From Table B-2
Note: Total Impact = 134,000
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TABLE C-1
CRITERIA WEIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE WEIGHTS FOR TRIAL C
Criteria
Equality of Opportunity
Income less than or 
equal to $3,000
Income between $3,000 
and $5,000
Income greater than 
or equal to $5,000
Efficiency
Degree Program
Very critical need 
Average need
Surplus of available manpower




ACT score greater than or 
equal to 30
ACT score between 10 and 30









































DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS TO STUDENT CATEGORIES 



































1 Accounting critical .090 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 avg. .120 .318
2 critical .090 in-state .240 high .060 low .200 .590
3 critical .090 in-state .240 avg. .048 avg. .120 .498
4 critical .090 in-state . 240 avg. .048 high .080 .458
5 critical .090 in-state .240 low .012 avg. .120 .462
6 History avg. .072 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 low .200 .380
7 avg. .072 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 avg. .120 .300
8 avg. .072 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 high .080 .260
9 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 low .200 .560
10 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 avg. .120 .480
11 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 high .080 .440
12 avg. .072 in-state .240 low .012 avg. .120 .444
13 Chemistry avg. .072 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 avg. .120 .300
14 avg. .072 in-state .240 high .060 avg. .120 .492
15 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 low .200 .560
16 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 avg. .120 .480
17 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 high .080 .440
18 avg. .072 in-state .240 low .012 low .200 .524
19 avg. .072 in-state .240 low .012 avg. .120 .444






































21 Management avg. .072 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 avg. .120 .300
22 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 low .200 .560
23 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg. .048 avg. .120 .480
24 avg. .072 in-state .240 avg .048 high .080 .440
25 avg. .072 in-state .240 low .012 avg. .120 .444
26 Elem Educ surplus .018 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 low .200 .326
27 surplus .018 out-of-state .060 avg. .048 avg. .120 .246
28 surplus .018 out-of-state .060 low .012 high .080 .170
29 surplus .018 in-state .240 high .060 avg. .120 .438
30 surplus .018 in-state .240 high .050 high .080 .398
31 surplus .018 in-state .240 avg. .048 low .200 .506
32 surplus .018 in-state .240 avg. .048 avg. .120 .426
33 surplus .018 in-state .240 avg. .048 high .080 .386
34 surplus .018 in-state .240 low .012 low .200 .470
35 surplus .018 in-state .240 low .012 avg. .120 .390
36 surplus .018 in-state .240
i
low .012 high .080 .350
o
See Chapter 4 and Table C-1 for an explanation of these criteria and their 
effective weights.

















CjWj Subsidy Per FTE
Net Fee 
Per FTE
1 1 $1842 .318 585 $982 $8602 3 1842 .590 1086 1825 173 11 1842 .498 917 1540 3024 3 1842 .458 843 1417 4255 1 1842 .462 851 1430 4126 1 1190 .380 452 760 4307 1 1190 .300 357 600 5908 1 1190 .260 309 517 6739 9 1190 .560 666 1120 7010 32 1190 .480 571 960 23011 12 1190 .440 523 877 31312 1 1190 .444 528 887 30313 1 2110 .300 633 1062 104814 1 2110 .492 1038 1745 36515 3 2110 .560 1181 1985 12516 11 2110 .480 1012 1700 41017 2 2110 .440 928 1560 55018 1 2110 .524 1105 1857 25319 1 2110 .444 936 1572 53820 1 2110 .404 852 1432 67821 1 1300 .300 390 655 64522 1 1300 . 560 728 1222 7823 4 1300 .480 624 1047 25324 1 1300 .440 572 960 34025 1 1300 .444 577 970 33026 2 1140 .326 371 622 51827 6 1140 .246 280 470 67028 2 1140 .170 193 322 81829 2 1140 .438 499 837 30330 1 1140 .398 453 760 38031 23 1140 .506 576 967 17332 84 1140 .426 485 815 32533 27 1140 .386 440 740 40034 1 1140 .470 535 897 24335 5 1140 .390 444 745 39536 1 1140 .350 399 670 470
From Table c-2
Note: Total Impact = 148,637
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TABLE D-1
CRITERIA WEIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE WEIGHTS FOR TRIAL D
Criteria
Equality of Opportunity
Income less than or 
equal to $3,000
Income between $3,000 
and $5,000
Income greater than 
or equal to $5,000
Efficiency
Degree Program
Very critical need 
Average need
Surplus of available manpower




ACT score greater than or 
equal to 30
ACT score between 10 and 30









































DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS TO STUDENT CATEGORIES 



































1 Accounting critical .108 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 avg. .100 .265
2 critical .108 in-state .324 high .036 low .280 .748
3 critical .108 in-state .324 avg. .021 avg. .100 .553
4 critical .108 in-state .324 avg. .021 high .020 .473
5 critical .108 in-state .324 low .003 avg. .100 .535
6 History avg. .054 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 low .280 .391
. 7 avg. .054 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 avg. .100 .211
8 avg. .054 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 high .020 .131
9 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 low .280 .679
10 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 avg. .100 .499
11 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 high .020 .419
12 avg. .054 in-state .324 low .003 avg. .100 .481
13 Chemistry avg. .054 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 avg. .100 .211
14 avg. .054 in-state .324 high .036 avg. .100 .514
15 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 low .280 .679
16 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 avg. .100 .499
17 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 high .020 .419
18 avg. .054 in-state .324 low .003 low .280 .661
19 avg. .054 in-state .324 low .003 avg. .100 .481





































21 Management avg. .054 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 avg. .100 .211
22 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 low .280 .679
23 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg. .021 avg. .100 .499
24 avg. .054 in-state .324 avg .021 high .020 .419
25 avg. .054 in-state .324 low .003 avg. .100 .481
26 Elem Educ surplus .018 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 low .280 .355
27 surplus .018 out-of-state .036 avg. .021 avg. .100 .175
28 surplus .018 out-of-state .036 low .003 high .020 .077
29 surplus .018 in-state .324 high .036 avg. .100 .478
30 surplus .018 in-state .324 high .036 high .020 .398
31 surplus .018 in-state .324 avg. .021 low .280 .643
32 surplus .018 in-state .324 avg. .021 avg. .100 .463
33 surplus .018 in-state .324 avg. .021 high .020 .383
34 surplus .018 in-state .324 low .003 low .280 .625
35 surplus .018 in-state .324 low .003 avg. .100 .445
36 surplus .018 in-state .324 low .003 high .020 .365
See Chapter 4 and Table D-1 for an explanation of these criteria and their 
effective weights.

















CjW. Subsidy Per FTE
Net Fee 
Per FTE
1 1 $1842 .265 488 $ 757 $10852 3 1842 .748 1377 2140 -2983 11 1842 .553 1018 1582 2604 3 1842 .473 871 1355 4875 1 1842 .535 985 1530 3126 1 1190 .391 465 722 4687 1 1190 .211 251 390 8008 1 1190 .131 155 240 9509 9 1190 .679 808 1255 -6510 32 1190 .499 593 922 26811 12 1190 .419 498 772 41812 1 1190 .481 572 887 30313 1 2110 .211 445 690 142014 1 2110 .514 1084 1685 42515 3 2110 .679 1432 2227 -11716 11 2110 .499 1052 1635 47517 2 2110 .419 884 1375 73518 1 2110 .661 1394 2167 -5719 1 2110 .481 1014 1577 53320 1 2110 .401 846 1315 79521 1 1300 .211 274 425 87522 1 1300 .679 882 1370 -7023 4 1300 .499 648 1007 29324 1 1300 .419 544 845 45525 1 1300 .481 625 970 33026 2 1140 .355 404 627 51327 6 1140 .175 199 307 83328 2 1140 .077 87 135 100529 2 1140 .478 544 845 29530 1 1140 .398 453 702 43831 23 1140 .643 733 1140 032 84 1140 .463 527 817 32333 27 1140 .383 436 677 46334 1 1140 .625 712 1107 3335 5 1140 .445 507 787 35336 1 1140 .365 416 645 495
From Table D-2
Note: Total Impact = 160,697
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TABLE E-1
CRITERIA WEIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE WEIGHTS FOR TRIAL E
Criteria
Equality of Opportunity
Income less than or 
equal to $3,000
Income between $3,000 
and $5,000
Income greater than 
or equal to $5,000
Efficiency
Degree Program
Very critical need 
Average need
Surplus of available manpower




ACT score greater than or 
equal to 30
ACT score between 10 and 30









































DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS TO STUDENT CATEGORIES 



































1 Accounting critical .135 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 avg. .060 .237
2 critical .135 in-state .342 high .030 low .320 .827
3 critical .135 in-state .342 avg. .024 avg. .060 .561
4 critical .135 in-state .342 avg. .024 high .020 .521
5 critical .135 in-state .342 low .006 avg. .060 .543
6 History avg. .036 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 low .320 .398
7 avg. .036 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 avg. .060 .138
8 avg. .036 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 high .020 .098
9 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 low .320 .722
10 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 avg. .060 .462
11 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 high .020 .422
12 avg. .036 in-state .342 low -006 avg. .060 .444
13 Chemistry avg. .036 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 avg. .060 .138
14 avg. .036 in-state .342 high .030 avg. .060 .468
15 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 low .320 .722
16 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 avg. .060 .462
17 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 high .020 .422
18 avg. .036 in-state .342 low .006 low .320 . 704
19 avg. .036 in-state .342 low .006 avg. .060 .444





































21 Management avg. .036 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 avg. .060 .138
22 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 low .320 .722
23 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg. .024 avg. .060 .462
24 avg. .036 in-state .342 avg .024 high .020 .422
25 avg. .036 in-state .342 low .006 avg. .060 .444
26 Elem Educ surplus .009 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 low .320 .371
27 surplus .009 out-of-state .018 avg. .024 avg. .060 .111
28 surplus .009 out-of-state .018 low .006 high .020 .053
29 surplus .009 in-state .342 high .030 avg. .060 .441
30 surplus .009 in-state .342 high .030 high .020 .401
31 surplus .009 in-state .342 avg. .024 low .320 .695
32 surplus .009 in-state .342 avg. .024 avg. .060 .435
33 surplus .009 in-state .342 avg. .024 high .020 .395
34 surplus .009 in-state .342 low .006 low .320 .677
35 surplus .009 in-state .342 low .006 avg. .060 .417
36 surplus .009 in-state .342 low .006 high .020 .377
See Chapter 4 and Table E-1 for an explanation of these criteria and their 
effective weights.

















CjWj Subsidy Per FTE
Net Fee 
Per FTE
1 1 $1842 .237 436 $ 690 $11522 3 1842 .827 1523 2412 -5703 11 1842 .561 1033 1635 2074 3 1842 .521 959 1517 3255 1 1842 .543 1000 1582 2605 1 1190 .398 473 747 4437 1 1190 .138 164 257 9338 1 1190 .098 116 182 10089 9 1190 .722 859 1360 -17010 32 1190 .462 549 867 32311 12 1190 .422 502 795 39512 1 1190 .444 528 835 35513 1 2110 .138 291 460 165014 1 2110 .468 987 1562 54815 3 2110 .722 1523 2412 -30216 11 2110 .462 974 1542 56817 2 2110 .422 890 1407 70318 1 2110 .704 1485 2352 -24219 1 2110 .444 936 1482 62820 1 2110 .404 852 1347 76321 1 1300 .138 179 282 101822 1 1300 .722 938 1485 -18523 4 1300 .462 600 950 35024 1 1300 .422 548 867 43325 1 1300 .444 577 912 38826 2 1140 .371 422 667 47327 6 1140 .111 126 197 94328 2 1140 .053 60 95 104529 2 1140 .441 502 795 34530 1 1140 .401 457 722 41831 23 1140 .695 792 1252 -11232 84 1140 .435 495 782 35833 27 1140 .395 450 712 42834 1 1140 .677 771 1220 -8035 5 1140 .417 475 752 38836 1 1140 .377 429 677 463
From Table E-2
Note: Total Impact = 157,807
APPENDIX F
C»IPARISON OF RESULTS OF TRIAL RUNS, SUBSIDIES AND STUDENT FEES 







Trial A Trial B Trial C Trial D Trial E
Subsidy Fee Subsidy Fee Subsidy Fee Subsidy Fee Subsidy Fee
1 1 Avg. Critical Out-of state Avg. $34.17 $ 27.23 $35.67 $ 25.73 $32.73 $28.67 $25.23 $ 36.17 $23.00 $ 38.40
2 3 Low Critical In-state High 62.40 - 1.00 64.07 - 2.67 60.83 0.57 71.33 - 9.93 80.40 -19.00
3 11 Avg. Critical In-state Avg. 50.40 11.00 49.40 12.00 51.33 10.07 52.73 8.67 54.50 6.90
4 3 High Critical In-State Avg. 45.00 16.40 42.57 18.83 47.23 14.17 45.17 16.23 50.57 10.83
5 1 Avg. Critical In-state Low 47.17 14.23 46.47 14.73 47.67 13.73 51.00 10.40 52.73 8.67
6 1 Low Critical Out-of-state Avg. 28.00 11.67 31.00 8.67 25.33 14.33 24.07 15.60 24.90 14.77
7 1 Avg. Avg. Out-of-state Avg. 21.00 18.67 22.17 17.50 20.00 19.67 13.00 26.67 8.57 31.10
8 1 High Avg. Out-of-state Avg. 17.50 22.17 17.67 22.00 17.23 22.43 8.00 31.67 6.07 33.60
9 9 Low Avg. In-state Avg. 38.50 1.17 39.90 - 0.23 37.33 2.33 41.83 - 2.17 45.33 - 5.67
10 32 Avg. Avg. In-state Avg. 31.50 8.17 31.00 8.67 32.00 7.67 30.73 8.93 28.90 10.77
11 12 High Avg. In-state Avg. 28.00 11.67 26.57 13.10 29.23 10.43 25.73 13.93 26.50 13.17
12 1 Avg. Avg. In-state Low 29.40 10.27 29.23 10.43 29.57 10.10 29.57 10.10 27.83 11.83
13 1 Avg. Avg. Out-of-state Avg. 37.23 33.10 40.33 30.00 35.40 34.93 23.00 47.33 15.33 55.00
14 1 Avg. Avg. In-state High 57.17 13.17 56.07 14.27 58.17 12.17 56.17 14.17 52.07 18.27
15 3 Low Avg. In-state Avg. 68.33 2.00 70.83 - 0.50 66.17 4.17 74.23 - 3.90 80.40 -10.07
16 11 Avg. Avg. In-state Avg. 55.90 14.43 55.07 15.27 56.67 13.67 54.50 15.83 51.40 18.93
17 2 High Avg. In-state Avg. 49.73 20.60 47.17 23.17 52.00 18.33 45.83 24.50 46.90 23.43
18 1 Low Avg. In-state Low 64.67 5.67 67.57 2.77 61.90 8.43 72.23 - 1.90 78.40 — 8.07
19 1 Avg. Avg. In-state Low 52.17 18.17 51.90 18.43 52.40 17.93 52.57 17.77 49.40 20.93
20 1 High Avg. In-state Low 45.90 24.43 44.00 26.33 47.73 22.60 43.83 26.50 44.90 25.43
21 1 Avg. Avg. Out-of-state Avg. 22.90 20.43 24.23 19.10 21.83 21.50 14.17 29.17 9.40 33.93
22 1 Low Avg. In-state Avg. 42.07 1.27 43.57 - 0.23 40.73 2.60 45.67 - 2.33 49.50 - 6.17
23 4 Avg. Avg. In-state Avg. 34.40 8.93 33.90 9.43 34.90 8.43 33.57 9.77 31.67 11.67
24 1 High Avg. In-state Avg. 30.57 12.77 29.07 14.27 32.00 11.33 28.17 15.17 28.90 14.43
25 1 Avg. Avg. In-state Low 32.17 11.17 31.90 11.43 32.33 11.00 32.33 11.00 30.40 12.93
26 2 Low Surplus Out-of-state Avg. 23.73 14.27 27.17 10.83 20.73 17.27 20.90 17.10 22.23 15.77
27 6 Avg. Surplus Out-of-state Avg. 17.07 20.93 18.57 19.43 15.67 22.33 10.23 27.77 6.57 31.43
28 2 High Surplus Out-of-state Low 11.67 26.33 12.67 25.33 10.73 27.27 4.50 33.50 3.17 34.83
29 2 Avg. Surplus In-state High 27.83 10.17 27.67 10.33 27.90 10.10 28.17 9.83 26.50 11.50
30 1 High Surplus In-state High 24.50 13.50 23.50 14.50 25.33 12.67 23.40 14.60 24.07 13.93
31 23 Low Surplus In-state Avg. 33.83 4.17 35.67 2.33 32.23 5.77 38.00 0.00 41.73 - 3.73
32 84 Avg. Surplus In-state Avg. 27.17 10.83 27.17 10.83 27.17 10.83 27.23 10.77 26.07 11.93
33 27 High Surplus In-state Avg. 23.73 14.27 22.90 15.10 24.67 13.33 22.57 15.43 23.73 14.27
34 1 Low Surplus In-state Low 31.83 6.17 34.00 4.00 29.90 8.10 36.90 1.10 40.67 - 2.67
35 5 Avg. Surplus In-state Low 25.17 12.83 25.40 12.60 24.83 13.17 26.23 11.77 25.07 12.93
36 1 High Surplus In-state Low 21.73 16.27 21.23 16.77 22.33 15.67 21.50 16.50 22.57 15.43
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APPENDIX G
AN EXAMPLE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AS 
APPLIED TO A STATE NETWORK
The proposed model for assessing student fees must be 
administratively and politically feasible. The political feas­
ibility must be determined by the appropriate higher education 
and political leaders but the administrative feasibility can 
be generally outlined at this time. In order for this sys­
tem to be most effective in a state network of institutions, 
the state should have a central agency responsible for the 
determination of budgetary needs in higher education on a 
statewide basis and responsible for the allocation of funds 
to the institutions. The State of Oklahoma has such an agency—  
The Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education This example 
will, therefore, be applied to the Oklahoma State System of 
Higher Education for a typical fall semester enrollment period.
The Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, then, 
would follow the following proposed timetable of implementative 
steps ;
FALL
The State Regents determine the instructional budgetary 
support needed for the upcoming fiscal year at each institution
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in the approved educational programs. As this information is 
compiled for each institution and submitted to the Oklahoma 
Legislature for the State System, it should be emphasized to 
the Legislature that this is the expenditure level at which 
the institutions will operate their educational programs and 
that the State appropriation will be: (1) used to subsidize
and reduce the costs to the students to the extent that funds 
are made available and, (2) allocated to students according 
to the student fee model.
SPRING THROUGH LATE-SUMMER 
The students pre-enroll as normal. During pre-enroll­
ment each student completes a State Regents Data Card. Each 
institution keypunches and validates the information on the 
Data Cards and transmits them to the State Regents office by 
a specified date. The student does not pay any fees at this 
time.
LATE SUMMER
The State Regents office applies the student fee model 
to the data cards and transmits to each institution a computer 
listing which includes for each pre-enrolled student the follow­
ing type of information:
Total Total Net Net
Student's Program State Student Student Fee
Name Cost Subsidy Fee Per SCH
John Doe $800 $575 $225 $15
124
The computer run could not be undertaken until essentially all 
the data cards were in. It would, therefore, be delayed until 
the start of school. This would allow students all spring and 
summer to pre-enroll. The primary concern with timing would 
be that a majority of students pre-enroll early enough to 
allow sufficient time for keypunching by the institutions.
BEGINNING OF SCHOOL 
Each student validates his pre-enrollment by paying 
the Net Student Fee as shown on the computer listing. Since 
the Net Student Fee per Student Credit Hour for any particular 
student is the same regardless of the courses in which he 
enrolls, dropping and adding courses will not constitute a 
problem. If the student drops credit hours, he is refunded 
by credit hour according to the Net Student Fee per Student 
Credit Hour. If the student adds credit hours, he pays addi­
tional fees per credit hour according to the same technique.
